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INTRODUCTION 
 
When the Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded in the Gulf of Mex-
ico in April 2010, the world was horrified.  That horror grew exponen-
tially in the following weeks as the gallon count of spilled oil bal-
looned.  That something so devastating threatened the Gulf Coast and 
the Mississippi River Delta, an area all too recently ravaged by Hurri-
cane Katrina, ignited American indignation.  Corporate irresponsibil-
ity, possibly even corporate malfeasance, threatened the economy and 
the ecology of the still-recovering region.  The world demanded an-
swers. 
Thousands of miles away, residents of a different delta—Nigeria’s 
Niger Delta—have long since ceased to demand answers.  For more 
than half a century, oil spills totaling twice that of Deepwater Horizon 
have become part of the status quo—the cost of doing business with 
multinational oil companies.  The difference in the Niger Delta is that 
those who reap the benefits of that business, and those who bear its 
costs, are wholly different parties.   
The region’s massive oil reserves are, in some respects, a bless-
ing, forming the bedrock of the Nigerian economy.  Those reserves 
have generated billions of dollars, and will continue to do so for the 
foreseeable future.
1
  Those revenues have not trickled down, however.  
Oil wealth has been diverted for decades into the bank accounts of 
  
 1 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEFS: NIGERIA 2 (Au-
gust 2011), http://www.eia.gov/cabs/Nigeria/pdf.pdf [hereinafter EIA COUNTRY 
ANALYSIS BRIEF]. 
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political elites who reside miles away from the oil pipelines.
2
  For 
Delta residents, the region’s vast oil reserves are a curse: black gold 
that has poisoned the earth, the water, the air, and the people. 
The catastrophic damage to the region is by no means a new   
phenomenon.  For fifty years, oil has spilled into the watershed—and 
the clean-up efforts by Shell, Chevron, and Exxon have been nominal 
at best.  Disregard for damage to people and property that would be 
unthinkable in the United States is standard operating procedure in the 
Niger Delta.  Because the Nigerian government has historically been 
both unwilling and unable to regulate the operations of its foreign 
partners, members of the local population have resorted to violence to 
voice their grievances.   
The status quo cannot continue.  Years of persistent cyclical con-
flict have entrenched opposing parties in their positions, and each side 
is responsible for enough of the blame for the region’s degradation 
that neither side has been held liable.  Reliance on the parties involved 
to negotiate a solution risks further environmental and human health 
damage to a region that should have to tolerate no more.  Given these 
stark realities, this Note advocates for a solution that has not yet been 
tried: pursuit of common law tort claims by Nigerian citizens against 
American-owned oil companies in American courts.  This Note aims 
to leverage increasing expectations of corporations as global citizens 
into legal action on behalf of victims of oil spills in the developing 
world.  In so doing, this Note may thereby elucidate a potential, 
peaceful method of recovery for previously-marginalized populations. 
Part I of this Note details the human health effects of oil spills, 
particularly the chemical toxicity of crude oil, and the dangerous ill-
nesses that can result from severe, prolonged exposure.  Part II pre-
sents the circumstances and impact of the two worst oil spills affect-
ing the United States. in recent history—Exxon Valdez and Deep-
water Horizon—to directly contrast with Part III’s discussion of the 
impact of oil spills in Nigeria.  Part IV examines the three major liti-
gation options for Nigerian plaintiffs: (1) domestic suits in Nigerian 
courts, (2) Alien Tort Claims in U.S. federal courts, and (3) common 
law tort claims in U.S. federal courts.  Part IV advocates for the third 
option—the use of common law tort claims—as the road to recovery.  
It concludes by presenting the prima facie elements of a potential tort 
action by Nigerian plaintiffs against a U.S.-based multinational oil 
company. 
 
 
  
 2 See infra Part III.B.1. 
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I. HUMAN HEALTH EFFECTS OF OIL SPILLS 
 
Studies documenting the impact of exposure to crude oil are nu-
merous and consistent in their findings: the toxic substances in crude 
oil and the waste products generated by oil extraction are hazardous to 
human health.
3
  The amount of attention paid to such findings varies 
by country, with the level of interest generally bearing an inverse rela-
tionship to how developed the country is.
4
  Whereas wealthy, devel-
oped nations like the United States have the resources and the institu-
tional capacity to mitigate and manage severe ecological catastrophes 
like the Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon oil spills, poorer, less-
developed nations like Ecuador and Nigeria are much less capable.  
As a result, the human health impact of oil spills in these countries is 
understandably greater. 
 
A. The Chemical Toxicity of Crude Oil 
 
Crude oil, a naturally-occurring substance that is refined into 
commercially usable energy sources, is a complex, variable mixture of 
organic compounds.
5
  Though its composition varies across geograph-
ic sources, the primary organic compounds in crude oil are hydrocar-
bons, which chemically bond together and with other chemical mole-
cules.
6
  The refining process and release of crude oil into the envi-
ronment, where it can combine and interact with other naturally oc-
curring substances, further modify crude oil’s chemical composition.7   
Some of the most dangerous organic compounds typically found 
in crude oil are benzene, toluene, and naphthalene.
8
  Benzene, a prov-
en carcinogen which primarily enters the body through respiratory 
inhalation, is known to cause leukemia.
9
  As early as 1948, the Amer-
  
 3 For thorough tables detailing the health studies conducted after oil spills, 
see Bernard D. Goldstein et al., The Gulf Oil Spill, 364 N. ENG. J. MED. 1334, 1336–
38, 1340–43 (2011). 
 4 Compare Part II, with Part III. 
 5 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES 
& DISEASE REGISTRY, TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR TOTAL PETROLEUM 
HYDROCARBONS 1 (Sept. 1999), available at 
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp123.pdf [hereinafter TOXICOLOGICAL 
PROFILE]. 
 6 Id. at 18. 
 7 Id. at 19. 
 8 Gina M. Solomon & Sarah Janssen, Health Effects of the Gulf Oil Spill, 
304 JAMA 1118, 1118 (2010) 
 9 TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE, supra note 5, at 5.  In 1987, the World Health 
Organization’s International Agency for Research on Cancer classified benzene as a 
Group 1, or proven, carcinogen.  See INT’L AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER, 
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ican Petroleum Institute stated that “the only absolutely safe concen-
tration of benzene is zero.”10  Both toluene and naphthalene are classi-
fied as “reasonably anticipated to cause cancer in humans” by the 
National Toxicology Program of the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services.
11
  Respiratory exposure to toluene can cause fatigue, 
headache, and nausea, and long-term exposure can permanently dam-
age the central nervous system.
12
  Exposure to naphthalene can dam-
age or destroy red blood cells, and cause hemolytic anemia.
13
  Ben-
zene, toluene and naphthalene can all contaminate water and food 
sources, and can enter the body through ingestion of either.
14
 
Crude oil also contains polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons 
(PAHs).
15
  Also classified as “[r]easonably anticipated to be human 
carcinogens,” PAHs are released into the atmosphere in many ways, 
such as during the combustion of coal and wood, or through industrial 
emissions.
16
  Once released, PAH compounds can be inhaled or con-
taminate food and groundwater sources.
17
  Exposure to PAHs has 
been linked to bladder, skin, and lung cancers.
18
  Though the majority 
of toxic PAH exposure is via respiratory inhalation of toxins in the 
ambient air,
19
 contact with crude oil containing high concentrations of 
PAHs can lead to absorption through the skin.
20
  Studies have shown 
  
WORLD HEALTH ORG., IARC MONOGRAPHS ON THE EVALUATION OF CARCINOGENIC 
RISKS TO HUMANS, 4, 120 (Supp. 7, 1987), available at 
http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Monographs/suppl7/Suppl7.pdf.  Even low level ex-
posure over a prolonged period can cause leukemia.  R. Duarte-Davidson et al., Ben-
zene in the Environment: An Assessment of the Potential Risks to the Health of the 
Population, 58 OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 2, 12 (2001). 
 10 AM. PETROLEUM INST., API TOXICOLOGICAL REVIEW: BENZENE 4 (1948), 
available at http://www.hobsonbradley.com/articles/pdf/pdffile.pdf. 
 11 NAT’L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, PUB. HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
& HUMAN SERVS., REPORT ON CARCINOGENS, 276, 414 (12th ed. 2011), available at 
http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/ntp/roc/twelfth/roc12.pdf [hereinafter REPORT ON 
CARCINOGENS]. 
 12 TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE, supra note 5, at 4. 
 13 AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, TOXFAQS FOR 
NAPHTHALENE, 1-METHYLNAPTHALENE, 2-METHYLNAPTHALENE 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfacts67.pdf. 
 14 Duarte-Davidson, supra note 9, at 4; TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE, supra note 
5, at 3–4. 
 15 TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE, supra note 5, at 6. 
 16 REPORT ON CARCINOGENS, supra note 11, at 353, 358; Carl-Elis Bostrom et 
al., Cancer Risk Assessment, Indicators and Guidelines for Polycyclic Aromatic Hy-
drocarbons in the Ambient Air, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 451, 451 (2002). 
 17 REPORT ON CARCINOGENS, supra note 11, at 358. 
 18 Bostrom, supra note 16, at 452. 
 19 Id. at 452–53. 
 20 REPORT ON CARCINOGENS, supra note 11, at 358–59. 
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that skin contact with substances containing PAHs, like asphalt, oil, or 
tar, can result in topical skin infections, rashes, and skin tumors.
21
  
 
B. The Acute and Long-Term Health Effects of Ex-
posure to Crude Oil 
 
The toxicity of crude oil varies according to its chemical composi-
tion and the duration and manner of an individual’s exposure to the 
substance.
22
  Everyone is exposed to at least some of the compounds 
in crude oil in small doses, at gas stations and in parking garages, but 
symptoms generally do not present absent significant exposure.
23
  
Prolonged exposure to large amounts of environmental toxins has a 
greater adverse impact on human health.
24
  For instance, the dizziness 
and fatigue caused by exposure to toluene will subside once exposure 
ends.
25
  Continuous exposure can become toxic, however.
26
  Assess-
ment of the symptoms and impact of exposure to the toxins in crude 
oil is therefore best bifurcated into acute and long-term effects.   
Acute symptoms related to short-term exposure to crude oil have 
been documented in a number of groups, particularly clean-up work-
ers employed after spills.
27
  In the past, workers and coastal residential 
populations impacted by oil spills reported and/or sought medical 
treatment for headaches, nausea, vomiting, dizziness, and respiratory 
distress.
28
  These are the types of symptoms that would be expected in 
  
 21 Solomon & Janssen, supra note 8, at 1118; AGENCY FOR TOXIC 
SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, POLYCYCLIC AROMATIC HYDROCARBONS (PAHS) 1 
(Sept. 1996), http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfacts69.pdf. 
 22 TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE, supra note 5, at 4. 
 23 Id. at 3. 
 24 Through the process of bioaccumulation, organic contaminants can built 
up in the environment, and can then be absorbed by, consumed by, or otherwise trans-
ferred to, living organisms.  This absorption/consumption of contaminated substances 
“can result in the consumer being exposed to high dosages of toxic chemicals.”  D. 
Mackay & A. Fraser, Bioaccumulation of Persistent Organic Chemicals: Mechanisms 
and Models, 110 ENVTL. POLLUTION 375, 375 (2000). 
 25 TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE, supra note 5, at 4. 
 26 Mackay & Fraser, supra note 24, at 375. 
 27 MARGARET A. MCCOY & JUDITH A. SALERNO, ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF 
THE GULF OF MEXICO OIL SPILL ON HUMAN HEALTH: A SUMMARY OF THE JUNE 2010 
WORKSHOP 48–49 (2010), available at 
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12949&page=R1.  See also BRADLEY 
S. KING & JOHN D. GIBBINS, NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUP. SAFETY & HEALTH, HEALTH 
HAZARD EVALUATION OF DEEPWATER HORIZON RESPONSE WORKERS 2–3 (2011), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/hhe/reports/pdfs/2010-0115-0129-3138.pdf. 
 28 Solomon & Janssen, supra note 8, at 1118; Naveed Zafar Janjua et al., 
Acute Health Effects of the Tasman Spirit Oil Spill on Residents of Karachi, Pakistan, 
6 BMC PUB. HEALTH 84, 84 (2006). 
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persons exposed for short periods to toxic chemicals like benzene, 
toluene, and naphthalene.
29
  While unpleasant, none of these symp-
toms are critical, and even minor symptoms can be prevented with 
proper training and equipment.
30
  Use of gloves, coveralls, and safety 
goggles, allowing workers to take rest breaks, and encouraging ade-
quate hydration can minimize health problems during clean-up ef-
forts.
31
  A study of individuals involved in the clean-up efforts follow-
ing a tanker spill off the coast of Karachi, Pakistan also noted de-
creased lung function in workers.
32
  But the study, which included a 
follow-up one year after the spill, noted that this impairment was re-
versible so long as exposure to crude oil ended.
33
 
The symptoms associated with long-term exposure to crude oil are 
much more serious.  Paradoxically, far fewer studies document these 
much more serious problems.
34
  While clean-up workers experience 
acute effects that typically dissipate with time once they have left the 
contaminated area, populations unfortunate enough to experience oil 
spills close to their homes typically cannot leave, even if getting away 
from the toxins is all it would take to avoid serious health conse-
quences.
35
  Health problems become even more pronounced when oil 
spills affect residential populations in developing countries.
36
   
  
 29 See Solomon & Janssen, supra note 8, at 1118; Ronan A. Lyons, et al., 
Acute Health Effects of the Sea Empress Oil Spill, 53 J. EPIDEMIOLOGICAL 
COMMUNITY HEALTH 306, 306 (1999). 
 30 Solomon & Janssen, supra note 8, at 1119; Jose Miguel Carrasco et al., 
Association Between Health Information, Use of Protective Devices and Occurrence 
of Acute Health Problems in the Prestige Oil Spill Clean-Up in Asturias and Canta-
bria (Spain): A Cross-Sectional Study, 6 BMC PUB. HEALTH 1, 2 (2006). 
 31 Bryan Walsh, Assessing the Health Effects of the Oil Spill, TIME, June 25, 
2010, http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1999479,00.html. 
 32 Sultan Ayoub Meo, et al., Lung Function in Subjects Exposed to Crude Oil 
Spill into Sea Water, 56 MARINE POLLUTION BULLETIN 88, 92 (2008).  Karachi is the 
largest city in Pakistan, with an estimated population of 13.125 million as of 2009.  
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: PAKISTAN, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html (last up-
dated Sept. 20, 2012).  The dense population relative to the location of the oil spill is 
pertinent in the context of the problem this note addresses. 
 33 Meo et al., supra note 32, at 92. 
 34 “‘While extensive data exists on the effects of oil spills on wildlife and 
ecosystems, the effects on human health from these exposures have not been well 
studied.’” Cal Woodward, Gulf Oil Spill Exposes Gaps in Public Health Knowledge, 
182 CANADIAN MED. ASSOC. J 1290, 1290–91 (2010) (quoting Dr. Aubrey Miller, 
Senior Medical Adviser to the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences 
and the National Toxicology Program).  MCCOY & SALERNO, supra note 26, at 52 
(“[O]f the thousands of chemical structures in crude oil . . . only a very few of these 
structures have been tested individually for their toxic potential.”) 
 35 Residents in the Ecuadorian Amazon have been gravely impacted by oil 
extraction in the region.  Increasing rates of cancer in the region’s native populations 
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The overall damage done by oil spills in or near developed coun-
tries is not insignificant, but the relative magnitude of effect on a 
country like the United States or United Kingdom is significantly less 
than on a country like Ecuador or Nigeria.  This relative difference is 
illustrated by what is known about the health impact of oil spills more 
generally.  In the developed world, much of what is known about 
acute effects is based on reports from clinics or other health facilities 
that have treated symptomatic individuals.
37
  The majority of the in-
formation available about the health impact of exposure to crude oil is 
therefore known about acute symptoms, because data collection pre-
dominately occurs in countries able to halt the detrimental effects at 
the acute stage.
38
  In summer 2010, following the Gulf oil spill, the 
Institute of Medicine convened a conference in New Orleans to dis-
cuss the potential human health impact of such occurrences.
39
  At-
tendees “expressed frustration that they know little about the health 
risks of a substance that courses so ubiquitously through daily life.”40  
Because long-term health effects associated with toxic crude oil expo-
sure have not presented en masse in the United States, the opportuni-
ties for research and documentation have not presented either. 
These realities have generated a gap in the available data regard-
ing the human health consequences of oil spills.  Minor symptoms are 
best understood, while little is known about potentially fatal long-term 
  
have been documented since the mid-1980s.  See James Brooke, Pollution Of Water 
Tied to Oil In Ecuador, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1994, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/22/science/pollution-of-water-tied-to-oil-in-
ecuador.html; Anna-Karin Hurtig & Miguel San Sebastian, Geographical Differences 
in Cancer Incidence in the Amazon Basin of Ecuador in Relation to Residence Near 
Oil Fields, 31 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1021, 1023 (2002); see infra Part IV.C.1 for 
discussion of the litigation related to this pollution. 
 36 Meo et al., supra note 32, at 92; Hurtig & San Sebastian, supra note 35, at 
1021–23. 
 37 See Solomon & Janssen, supra note 8, at 1118; Lyons et al., supra note 29, 
at 309. 
 38 See, e.g., Stuart Fox, Gulf Spill Has Little Impact on Human Health, 
MSNBC.COM (May 3, 2010), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36921960/ns/health-
more_health_news/.  The author indicates that Americans need not be concerned 
about exposure to oil from the Gulf Spill (discussed infra Part II.B), and categorically 
states that “oil by itself cannot kill or seriously harm a human.”  Fox, supra.  Howev-
er, other studies disprove this summary thesis, and instead indicate how much, we do 
not know about the health effects of human exposure to crude oil.  A 2010 research 
review noted that although there have been thirty-eight major oil spills, only seven 
were followed by subsequent studies of the effects on human health.  Further, those 
studies that were conducted looked primarily at acute and psychological symptoms.  
Francisco Aguilera et al., Review on the Effects of Exposure to Spilled Oils on Human 
Health, 30 J. APPLIED TOXICOLOGY 291, 298 (2010). 
 39 See generally MCCOY & SALERNO, supra note 27. 
 40 Woodward, supra note 34, at 1290. 
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exposure to crude oil.
41
  Though a number of studies of oil-affected 
populations have been conducted in developing states, data collectors 
face significant problems.
42
  Researchers must often make concerted 
efforts to seek out subjects for their studies.  Reliance on reports from 
medical facilities is impractical because treatment is often unavailable 
for those affected by oil spills.
43
  Though something of a “chicken and 
egg” problem, the majority of accurate public health data is typically 
collected from a network of providers,
44
 but particularly in places 
where resources are limited, it is difficult to provide adequate medical 
services without understanding the scale of services needed.
45
  Data 
regarding a particular localized health problem and treatment of that 
health problem are inextricably linked.  Without sufficient data to 
demonstrate the severity of the problem, it is difficult to truly justify 
the need for treatment.
46
 And without adequate treatment options, 
individuals have few reasons to self-report.  These types of practical, 
societal problems further compound the public health impact of oil 
spills. 
 
II. THE IMPACT OF OIL SPILLS ON THE UNITED STATES 
 
A. Exxon Valdez 
 
In 1989, the Exxon Valdez supertanker ran aground on a reef off 
the coast of Alaska, spilling 11 million gallons of crude oil into Prince 
  
 41 Walsh, supra note 31 (“As catastrophic as the Gulf oil spill has been for 
the region’s environment and residents’ livelihoods, experts say the impact of the 
disaster on human health and well-being has not even begun to be quantified.”). 
 42 Meo et al., supra note 32, at 92. 
 43 Id.  Authors noted practical difficulties in obtaining results for their study, 
including unwillingness of individuals to participate because they feared they would 
be forced to retire if poor health was disclosed to their employers.  Participants had to 
be actively recruited, and assured that the study was actually for their individual bene-
fit.  See also Judith Kimerling, Indigenous Peoples and the Oil Frontier in Amazonia: 
The Case of Ecuador, Chevrontexaco, and Aguinda v. Texaco, 38 N.Y.U. J. OF INT'L  
L. & POL. 413, 466 (2006) (“These findings are likely just the tip of the iceberg be-
cause diagnostic services and health data are limited, especially in indigenous com-
munities; exposures to toxic chemicals continue; and in cases of cancer, latency peri-
ods delay the onset of disease, and five to forty years can pass between the date of the 
harmful exposures and the first appearance of symptoms of the disease.”). 
 44 See generally Division of Preparedness & Emerging Infections, CENTERS 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ncpdcid/deiss/about.html 
(last updated Apr. 1, 2011). 
 45 See generally Junaid A. Razzak & Arthur L. Kellermann, Emergency 
Medical Care in Developing Countries: Is it Worthwhile?, 80 BULL. WORLD HEALTH 
ORG. 900 (2002). 
 46 Id. at 904. 
544 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 22: 535] 
William Sound.
47
  At the time, the spill was the largest in U.S. history, 
and its remote location hampered clean-up efforts and exacerbated the 
already-devastating magnitude of damage to the environment and the 
economy.
48
  In the context of the problem that this note presents, 
however, the remote location of the Exxon Valdez spill was, in some 
ways, fortuitous.  The spill is infamous for damaging the ecosystem, 
which has still not recovered more than two decades later.
49
  But there 
have been few, if any, physical health consequences attributed to the 
spill.
50
  No major studies on the physical health impact of the spill 
have been conducted.
51
 
In addition to paying hundreds of millions of dollars in fines and 
restitution,
52
 Exxon contributed $2.1 billion to clean-up efforts.
53
  The 
Exxon Valdez Trustee Council and Public Advisory Committee—
comprised of state and federal experts on marine transportation, com-
mercial fishing, environmental conservation, and other matters—were 
formed.
54
  Two decades later, the Trustee Council continues to over-
see restoration efforts and manages the $900 million of settlement 
  
 47 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 478 (2008). 
 48 Emergency Management: Exxon Valdez, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/learning/exxon.htm (last updated Jan. 27, 2011). 
 49 Doug Struck, Twenty Years Later, Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Linger, 
YALE ENV’T 360 (Mar. 24, 2009), http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2133. 
 50 A number of studies have been conducted surveying the negative psycho-
logical impacts of the spill, and have noted general patterns of depression in the local 
population.  These mental health problems have been attributed in part to the econom-
ic consequences of the oil spill (e.g. stress over financial concerns due to the tremen-
dous impact on the local fishing industry), and are considerably different than the 
types of physical and epidemiological problems noted in other spills. See, e.g., Law-
rence A. Palkinkas, et al., Community Patterns of Psychiatric Disorders After the 
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1517, 1517 (1993); see also Gold-
stein et al., supra note 3, at 1340–43. 
 51 Recently, though, in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, individ-
uals involved in the Exxon Valdez clean-up have begun to come forward with health 
complaints. Drew Griffin, Critics Call Exxon Valdez Clean-up A Warning for Gulf 
Workers, CNN NEWS, (July 8, 2010, 10:33 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/07/07/oil.spill.valdez.workers/index.html. 
 52 “More than a hundred law firms were involved in over two hundred suits, 
involving more than thirty thousand claims.  The total damage claims exceeded fifty 
billion dollars.  Although some of the claims were settled or dismissed, more than ten 
thousand remained.”  Daniel A. Farber, Tort Law in the Era of Climate Change, 
Katrina and 9/11: Exploring Liability for Extraordinary Risks, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 
1075, 1102 (2009). 
 53 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 479 (2008). 
 54 EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TRUSTEE COUNCIL 2009 STATUS REPORT 7 
(2009), available at 
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/Universal/Documents/Publications/20th%20Anniversar
y%20Report/2009%20Status%20Report%20(Low-Res).pdf. 
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funds allotted to repair the ecosystem.
55
  At the height of the clean-up 
efforts, more than 11,000 people were participating, “ultimately be-
coming the largest private project in Alaska since construction of the 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline.”56  Of course, the damage to the region’s eco-
system was tremendous, but short of undoing the spill itself, there is 
little more that could have been done in terms of disaster relief efforts. 
 
B. Deepwater Horizon 
 
The Exxon Valdez’s position as the worst oil spill in U.S. history 
was overtaken on April 20, 2010, when the British Petroleum (BP) 
offshore oil rig Deepwater Horizon exploded, killing eleven workers 
and opening an oil gusher a mile below sea level on the ocean floor.
57
  
Over the next eighty-six days, until the leak was capped on July 15, 
205 million gallons of oil were released into the Gulf of Mexico.
58
  
Though just how much damage the BP spill will eventually cause is 
yet undetermined, what was undeniably remarkable was the scope and 
rapidity of the clean-up efforts.
59
  By April 28, responders were ready 
to execute an in situ burn: corralling the oil with fire-proof booms and 
lighting it ablaze to burn off the petroleum before the oil becomes too 
dispersed.
60
  Though this technique is not without its dangers, primari-
ly via the inevitable release of toxins into the air,
61
 it is known to be 
an effective technique for ridding a contained area of oil in a very 
short period.
62
  In addition, before the end of May, BP established a 
  
 55 Id. at 30–31. 
 56 Id. at 5. 
 57 Jonathan Weisman et al., Spill Tops Valdez Disaster. WALL ST. J., May 28, 
2010, at A1. 
 58 Campbell Robertson & Clifford Krauss, Gulf Spill Is the Largest of Its 
Kind, Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, at A14; Jeremy Repanich, The Deep-
water Horizon Spill by the Numbers, POPULAR MECHANICS, (Aug. 10, 2010, 12:39 
PM), 
http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/coal-oil-gas/bp-oil-spill-statistics. 
 59 See generally Recovery Plan, RESTORETHEGULF.GOV, 
http://www.restorethegulf.gov/task-force/recovery-plan (providing the US govern-
ment’s official information on the response, assistance, health and safety, the envi-
ronment and news) (last visited Oct. 24, 2011). 
60
 TIMELINE – Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, REUTERS (June 3, 2010, 9:10 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/03/oil-spill-events-idUSN0322326220100603.  NIR 
BARNEA, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ASS’N, HEALTH AND SAFETY ASPECTS OF IN-SITU 
BURNING OF OIL 1 (last visited Aug. 24, 2012), 
http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/sites/default/files/health-safety-ISB.pdf 
61
 BARNEA, supra note 60, at 2–6. 
62
 Id. at 1. 
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tip hotline and email address for suggestions for clean-up methods.
63
  
It received close to 100,000 tips and emails and reportedly seriously 
looked into 700 of them.
64
  As of August 2010, the National Institutes 
of Health had pledged $10 million to fund research on potential hu-
man health effects, and BP had pledged $500 million to fund research 
on the environmental and public health impact of the spill.
65
  And as 
of October 2010, the number of response workers involved in the Gulf 
clean-up was more than 55,000.
66
  Movie director/producer James 
Cameron offered BP the use of his private submarines,
67
 and actor 
Kevin Costner offered the centrifugal oil separator technology he be-
gan inventing fifteen years ago after starring in the film Waterworld.
68
  
As was true for the Exxon Valdez spill, the efforts of the best and the 
brightest will never be able to completely undo the damage, but at 
least some of the harm has been mitigated, and massive clean-up ef-
forts are ongoing.
69
 
 
III. THE IMPACT OF OIL SPILLS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD – 
NIGERIA 
 
In the developing world, oil spills garner far less attention than 
they do in the United States or Europe.  Unfortunately, developing 
states have other equally critical crises occurring simultaneously.  
  
 63 Matt Gutman & Jessica Hopper, The BP Bounce: Got an Oil Spill Idea for 
BP? Don’t Hold Your Breath, ABC NEWS, (May 24, 2010), 
http://abcnews.go.com/WN/bp-suggestion-box-overflows-
inventions/story?id=10730071. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Anita Slomski, Experts Focus on Identifying, Mitigating Potential Health 
Effects of Gulf Oil Leak, 304 JAMA 621, 624 (2010).  In addition, “[m]ore than 300 
staff from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Agency for 
Toxic Substance and Disease Registry (ATSDR) are monitoring health threats from 
the oil spill in five Gulf states through the National Poison Data System.”  Id.  
 66 The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health compiled a 
voluntary roster of response workers.  Deepwater Horizon Response – NIOSH Volun-
tary Roster of Deepwater Horizon Response Workers, NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUP. 
SAFETY & HEALTH, 
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/oilspillresponse/workerroster.html (last updated 
Dec. 13, 2011). 
 67 James Quinn, Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill: James Cameron Offers Private 
Submarines to Help BP Clean-Up, THE TELEGRAPH (U.K.), (May 13, 2010, 4:01 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/7719941/Gulf-of-
Mexico-oil-spill-James-Cameron-offers-private-submarines-to-help-BP-clean-
up.html. 
 68 Louis Sahagun, Costner to Gulf’s Rescue?, LOS ANGELES TIMES, May 21, 
2010, at AA1. 
 69 See supra note 59. 
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Spill-related problems tend to lie dormant because the most serious 
health damage done by oil spills only occurs when exposure is severe 
and protracted, and that damage takes time to manifest.  Even the 
damage from a serious spill near a densely populated urban area like 
Karachi, Pakistan, may be mitigated over time,
70
 so long as the spill is 
an isolated event and not part of a pattern.
71
  In a number of countries, 
however, severe oil spills have become regular occurrences, and the 
serious health consequences caused by exposure to crude oil are pre-
senting en masse.  One such country is Nigeria. 
 
A. History of the Nigerian Oil Industry 
 
The Niger Delta, located where the biggest river in West Africa 
meets the Atlantic Ocean, is one of the largest wetlands in the world,
72
 
covering approximately 27,000 square miles, and eleven states.
73
  The 
terrain is made up of swamps, estuaries, and dense mangrove forests, 
so much of the area is inaccessible by road,
74
 and “75% of the area . . . 
is regularly flooded by water.”75  Despite its inaccessibility, the great-
er region is home to more than 30 million people from forty ethnic 
groups.
76
  Annual population growth is estimated at three percent—
making the Delta one of the most densely populated areas in the 
world.
77
  Oil was first discovered in the region in 1956, and commer-
cial export began two years later.
78
  Due to its considerable reserves 
(estimated at 37.2 million barrels as of January 2011) and high quality 
product (the chemical composition of Nigerian oil is preferable for 
gasoline because it requires less refining), Nigeria is now one of the 
  
 70 See THE WORLD FACTBOOK: PAKISTAN, supra note 32. 
 71 See Meo et al., supra note 32, at 92. 
 72 Ibibia Lucky Worika, Deprivation, Despoilation and Destitution: Whither 
Environment and Human Rights in Nigeria’s Niger Delta? 8 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 1, 4 (2001). 
 73 John Ghazvinian, The Curse of Oil, VIRGINIA Q. REV. (2007), available at 
http://www.vqronline.org/articles/2007/winter/ghazvinian-curse-of-oil/; DUNCAN 
CLARKE, CRUDE CONTINENT: THE STRUGGLE FOR AFRICA’S OIL PRIZE 89 (2008). 
 74 Paul S. Orogun, Resource Control, Revenue Allocation, and Petroleum 
Politics in Nigeria: The Niger Delta Question, 75 GEOJOURNAL 459, 477 (2010). 
 75 FOSSIL FUELS, OIL COMPANIES, AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 57 (Tobias Hal-
ler et al. eds., 2007). 
 76 Orogun, supra note 74, at 460. 
 77 Id. 
 78 AMNESTY INT’L, NIGERIA: PETROLEUM, POLLUTION AND POVERTY IN THE 
NIGER DELTA 11 (2009), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR44/017/2009/en/e2415061-da5c-44f8-
a73c-a7a4766ee21d/afr440172009en.pdf [hereinafter PETROLEUM, POLLUTION & 
POVERTY]. 
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world’s major oil exporters, and the largest in Africa.79  In 1999, there 
were an estimated 150 oil fields and over 1400 oil wells in the Niger 
Delta; today, the number of oil fields has more than quadrupled, to 
606.
80
  The largest share of oil extracted from these wells, more than 
40 percent, is exported to the United States.
81
  That amount also 
makes Nigeria the fifth-largest exporter of oil to the United States.
82
   
Nigeria’s economy is based heavily on its oil, which generates 
over 95 percent of export revenue.
83
  According to the Nigerian Con-
stitution, all natural resources are property of the federal government, 
so those export revenues are payable to the state.
84
  The Nigerian Na-
tional Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) is the mechanism through 
which the government maintains control over the oil industry; the 
  
 79 EIA COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEF, supra note 1, at 2.  ‘Dejo Olowu, From 
Defiance to Engagement: An Evaluation of Shell’s Approach to Conflict Resolution in 
the Niger Delta, 10 AFR. J. CONFLICT RESOL. 75, 78 (2010). 
 80 Ana Godson et al., Environmental Risk Factors and Health Outcomes in 
Selected Communities of the Niger Delta Area, Nigeria, 129 PERSP. PUB. HEALTH 
183, 183–84 (2009) (citations omitted); Development of Nigeria’s Oil Industry, 
NIGERIAN NAT’L PETROLEUM CORP., 
http://www.nnpcgroup.com/NNPCBusiness/BusinessInformation/OilGasinNigeria/De
velopmentoftheIndustry.aspx (last visited Aug. 20, 2012).  
 81 EIA COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEF, supra note 1, at 4. 
 82 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Crude Oil and Total Petroleum Imports Top 
15 Countries (Nov. 29, 2011), 
http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/company_level_imports/
current/import.html.  The amount of oil the US imports from Nigeria significantly 
impacts the broader trade balance between the countries.  In 2008, 44 percent of U.S. 
trade with the entire Sub-Saharan African region was with Nigeria.  See VIVIAN C. 
JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31772, U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
RELATIONSHIP WITH SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE AFRICAN GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY 
ACT 6–7 (July 24, 2009), available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128835.pdf. 
 83 EIA COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEF, supra note 1, at 1. 
 84 CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), § 44 (3).  In the 1960s, the amount of 
oil revenue remitted to the Delta states was 50 percent, but that amount fell to 1.5 
percent by the 1990s.  Cyril Obi, Resource Control in Nigeria’s Niger Delta, 2 
GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE 59, 60 (2007), available at http://siu.no/eng/Front-Page/Global-
knowledge/Issues/No-2-2007/Resource-Control-in-Nigeria-s-Niger-Delta.  In 1999, 
following the democratic election of President Olusegun Obasanjo, oil remittances 
increased to 13 percent.  Id.  However, this 13 percent was recently limited, as in-
creasing amounts of oil are found offshore in the Gulf of Guinea, and representatives 
from other Nigerian states argued that the 13 percent should therefore only apply to 
revenues from onshore oil. AMNESTY INT’L, NIGERIA: TEN YEARS ON: INJUSTICE AND 
VIOLENCE HAUNT THE OIL DELTA 32 (2005).  Since independence in 1960, Nigeria’s 
leaders have predominately been from the Northern states, which have virtually no 
natural resources.  The increasing wealth of Northern political elites has “engrained in 
the Niger Delta crude oil producing populations the perception that the ‘Northerners’ 
are essentially exploiting, repressing, and dispossessing them of their resources and 
revenues.”  Orogun, supra note 74, at 467.  
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majority of multinational corporations (MNCs) which operate in Ni-
geria do so through joint ventures with the NNPC.
85
  The three prima-
ry MNCs operating in the Niger Delta are Shell, ExxonMobil, and 
Chevron.  Of these, the latter two are headquartered in the United 
States: ExxonMobil in Irving, Texas, and Chevron in San Ramon, 
CA.
86
 
 
B. The Impact of Oil on Nigeria 
 
1. Resource Control and the Cost of Doing 
Business 
 
MNCs reap considerable benefits from doing business in coun-
tries where legal and regulatory infrastructures are underdeveloped.  
Foreign investment is attractive to host countries because it generates 
jobs and economic activity, and is likewise attractive to MNCs be-
cause host countries often “have no comprehensive system of corpo-
rate regulation or the systems are ineffective due to lack of resources 
to enforce existing laws . . . .”87  Lower standards, both for workplace 
safety and environmental management, drive up corporate profit mar-
gins and therefore attract greater financial investment.
88
  The practice 
of developing states making their economies more attractive to over-
seas investors by tolerating increasingly dangerous business practices 
  
 85 Joint Venture Activities, Nigerian National Petroleum Group, NIGERIAN 
NAT’L PETROLEUM CORP., 
http://www.nnpcgroup.com/NNPCBusiness/UpstreamVentures/JointVentureActivitie
s.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).  For analysis of the NNPC, see CLARKE, supra note 
73, at 103–14. 
 86 Business Headquarters, EXXON MOBIL, 
http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/contactus_contact_businessheadquarters.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2011); Global Contacts, CHEVRON, 
http://www.chevron.com/contact/globalcontacts/ (last updated July 2011).  Shell, 
formally called Royal Dutch Shell, has its headquarters in the Netherlands, Contact 
Us, SHELL, http://www.shell.com/home/content/footer/about_this_site/contact_us/ 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2011). 
 87 E.E. Daschbach, Where There’s a Will, There’s a Way: The Cause for a 
Cure and Remedial Prescriptions for Forum Non Conveniens as Applied in Latin 
American Plaintiffs’ Actions Against U.S. Multinationals, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 
11, 24 (2007) (quoting Maxi Lyons, A Case Study in Multinational Corporate Ac-
countability: Ecuador’s Indigenous Peoples Struggle for Redress, 32 DENV. J. INT’L 
L. & POL’Y 701, 728 (2004)). 
 88 Malcolm J. Rogge, Towards Transnational Corporate Accountability in 
the Global Economy: Challenging the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in In re: 
Union Carbide, Alfaro, Sequihua, and Aguinda, 36 TEX. INT’L L.J. 299, 314–15 
(2001). 
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by foreign investors has been termed the “global race to the bottom.”89  
The fear that foreign investment by oil companies is causing a race to 
the bottom in terms of environmental standards is a very realistic one 
in the Niger Delta.
90
   
Though Nigeria is one of the world’s major oil exporters, and that 
should ideally translate into significant government revenues used to 
benefit the broader population, historically, that has not been the 
case.
91
  Only twenty percent of the population owns sixty-five percent 
of the wealth—while seventy percent of the population hovers around 
or below the poverty line.
92
  The majority of Nigerian citizens live on 
less than two dollars per day.
93
  According to the United Nations 2011 
Human Development Index, a metric based on a number of develop-
ment indicators including life expectancy, literacy rates, and individu-
al purchasing power parity, Nigeria ranked 156 out of 187 countries.
94
 
  
 89 See id. Commentators have defined the “global race to the bottom” as “the 
progressive movement of capital and technology from countries with relatively high 
wages, taxation and regulation to countries with relatively lower levels.” Daschbach, 
supra note 87, at 24–25 (quoting Debora L. Spar & David B. Yoffie, Multinational 
Enterprises and the Prospects for Justice, 52 J. INT’L AFF. 563–64 (1999)).  See also 
Brian R. Copeland & M. Scott Taylor, Trade, Growth and the Environment, 42 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 7, 9 (2004) (discussing the “race to the bottom” concept as it per-
tains to environmental protection). 
 90 See infra note 95–98 and accompanying text. 
 91 Economies tied to the export of a single natural resource are said to suffer 
from the “resource curse.”  While logic would seem to indicate that having an abun-
dance of a primary commodity like oil, ample evidence indicates that “primary com-
modity dependence is likely to be bad news for development.”  Paul Collier & Anke 
Hoeffler, Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 625, 627 
(2005).  Because state income is not derived from a tax base, there is less incentive 
for the government to manage the funds properly—and whomever can control the 
geographic region where the resources are extracted wields significant power.  Addi-
tionally, reliance on a single primary commodity makes the entire economy prone to 
global price shocks and quantity shocks.  Both of these problems increase the likeli-
hood of conflict, “confuse citizens’ comprehension of government performance.”  Id.  
See also Michael L. Ross, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse, 51 WORLD 
POL. 297, 301–07 (1999). 
 92 U.N. DEV. PROG., HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT: NIGERIA 2008-2009: 
ACHIEVING GROWTH WITH EQUITY, 47 (2009), available at 
http://www.ng.undp.org/documents/NHDR2009/NHDR_MAIN-REPORT_2008-
2009.pdf. 
 93 Two-thirds of Nigerians live on less than one dollar per day.  EBERE 
ONWUDIWE & CHLOE BERWIND-DART, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, BREAKING THE CYCLE OF 
ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA 9 (2010), available at 
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR263-
Breaking_the_Cycle_of_Electoral_Violence_in_Nigeria.pdf. 
 94 Human Development Index (HDI) - 2011 Rankings, U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ (last updated Nov. 2, 2011). 
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Due to federal ownership of resources and the NNPC’s unitary, 
but inefficient, control of the oil industry within Nigeria, oil-related 
financial transactions have traditionally occurred with little or no in-
put from the populations most affected by the extraction.
95
  The major 
oil corporations operating in the Niger Delta have also taken care to 
build relationships with senior government bureaucrats and to place 
influential Nigerians on their boards of directors.
96
  This way, the 
MNCs get oil, the federal government gets paid, and the transaction 
typically ends without due consideration of the day-to-day operations 
of the oil companies in the region.
97
  As a result, the oil companies 
have developed “abysmal oil-field practices characterized by, among 
other things, hazardous seismographic operations, poor installation 
and maintenance of pipelines . . . and regular blowouts.”98 
 
2. Oil Spills 
 
The Deepwater Horizon spill puts the situation in Nigeria in per-
spective.  Since extraction began in the 1950s, an estimated 546 mil-
lion gallons of oil have spilled into the Niger Delta, or approximately 
11 million gallons per year.
99
  This figure is more than double the 
amount spilled into the Gulf of Mexico, and more than fifty times the 
  
 95 Uwafiokun Idemudia & Uwem E. Ite, Demystifying the Niger Delta Con-
flict: Towards an Integrated Explanation, 33 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 391, 394–95 
(2006); see also INT’L CRISIS GROUP, NIGERIA’S FALTERING FEDERAL EXPERIMENT 4 
(2006), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-
africa/nigeria/Nigerias%20Faltering%20Federal%20Experiment.pdf.  “The NNPC 
has not been a well-managed entity and its turbulent strategies, complex structures 
and continuous management and staff changes have had negative impacts over the 
years.  In 1996 more than 3,000 employees, including over 600 directors and top 
officials, were sacked in a move touted as being ‘in the public interest and to enhance 
efficiency.’”  CLARKE, supra note 73, at 108. 
 96 Ike Okonta, The Disease of Elephants: Oil Rich ‘Minority’ Areas, Shell 
and International NGOs, in GULLIVER’S TROUBLES: NIGERIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 
AFTER THE COLD WAR 116, 122 (Adekeye Adebajo & Abdul Raufu Mustapha eds., 
2008). 
 97 Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, The Impact of Economic and Social Rights in 
Nigeria: An Assessment of the Legal Framework for Implementing Education and 
Health as Human Rights, in COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE 183, 200 (Varun Gauri & 
Daniel M. Brinks, eds., 2008).   
 98 Id.  See also FOSSIL FUELS, OIL COMPANIES, AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, 
supra note 75, at 69–74. 
 99 Adam Nossiter, Half a World from the Gulf, a Spill Scourge 5 Decades 
Old, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2010, at A1.  It is important to note, however, that the 
figures regarding the amount of oil spilled vary considerably based on the source.  
Official figures from the Nigerian government rely on self-reported spill data from the 
oil companies.  Those figures are significantly lower than those calculated by interna-
tional sources.  See PETROLEUM, POLLUTION & POVERTY, supra note 78, at 15–16. 
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amount spilled into Prince William Sound.
100
  A number of interna-
tional environmental groups list the Niger Delta as “among the five 
most polluted regions in the world.”101  More than half of the region’s 
population has no access to clean water as a result.
102
   
Despite the massive wealth that the region’s oil generates for the 
country, the majority of the region’s residents eke out a subsistence 
living—dependent on the natural environment for agriculture and fish-
ing.
103
  This means that the impact of oil spills in the region has as 
great an impact on the economy as on the environment.  When oil 
spills occur on farmland, the growing crops rarely survive, and be-
cause clean-up efforts are often minimal, the toxic substances in the 
oil
104
 have a long-term detrimental impact on soil fertility.
105
  Delta 
fishermen, once responsible for feeding much of the country’s interi-
or, now cannot even feed their families since few can afford the boat 
engines needed to leave the Delta for fresher waters.
106
  Oil therefore 
attacks Delta residents on all fronts, affecting their livelihoods, living 
conditions, and their lives. 
 
3. Gas Flaring 
 
Gas flaring, the practice of burning off natural gas from crude oil 
before it is refined,
107
 is a round-the-clock process in the Niger Delta.  
  
 100 Nossiter, supra note 99; see also Caroline Duffield, Nigeria: ‘World Oil 
Pollution Capital’ BBC NEWS (June 15, 2010, 6:33 AM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10313107 (commenting on the divergent levels of atten-
tion paid to oil spills in Nigeria vs. the Gulf of Mexico). 
 101 Okonta, supra note 96, at 118. 
 102 John Vidal, Nigeria’s Agony Dwarfs the Gulf Oil Spill. All We Do Is Ig-
nore It, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), May 30, 2010, at 20.  A large number of communities 
must “depend on untreated surface water and wells for drinking water, which leads to 
health problems from waterborne diseases.” PETROLEUM, POLLUTION & POVERTY, 
supra note 78, at 25. Studies of groundwater in the Delta region confirm that “without 
standard treatment is unfit for drinking and domestic uses.”  I.M. Adenkunle, et al., 
Assessment of Groundwater Quality in a Typical Rural Settlement in Southwest Nige-
ria, 4 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 307, 316 (2007); see also I. O. Asia, The 
Effects of Petroleum Exploration and Production Operations on the Heavy Metal 
Contents of Soil and Groundwater in Nigeria, 2 INT’L J. PHYSICAL SCI. 271, 272 
(2007). 
 103 PETROLEUM, POLLUTION & POVERTY, supra note 78, at 14.  The land in the 
region was previously arable.  Olowu, supra note 78, at 80. 
 104 See supra Part I.A. 
 105 PETROLEUM, POLLUTION & POVERTY, supra note 78, at 30. 
 106 Tom O’Neill, Curse of the Black Gold: Hope and Betrayal on the Niger 
Delta. NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 2007), available at 
http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2007/02/nigerian-oil/oneill-text/1. 
 107 Brown E. Umukoro, Gas Flaring, Environmental Corporate Responsibil-
ity and the Right to a Healthy Environment: The Case of the Niger Delta, in LAW AND 
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The gas spouts from “controlled infernos” so large that the fires can 
be seen from space.
108
  Many of the region’s gas flares are “near 
communities and farms and the burn continuously for several years at 
a time.”109  Flaring has serious environmental consequences, as the 
emissions released are the greenhouse gases that contribute to global 
warming.
110
  It also has serious health consequences, as those same 
emissions contain known carcinogens like benzene and PAHs.
111
  
Airborne toxins are the most dangerous as they rapidly enter the 
bloodstream once inhaled and are then distributed throughout the 
body by natural physiological processes.
112
  Further, the climate of the 
Niger Delta is rainy and tropical, so the chemicals released into the 
atmosphere return almost as quickly as acid rain.
113
  Flaring is, how-
ever, the cheapest way to get rid of waste gas, so the practice persists 
despite the serious risks it poses and the fact that the practice was out-
lawed by the Nigerian federal government in 1979.
114
 
 
4. Oil and Violence in the Niger Delta 
 
Blame for the extensive environmental and economic damage to 
the region can be divided among a wide variety of actors.  The prima-
  
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA: CURRENT CHALLENGES 49, 50 (Festus Emiri & 
Gowon Deinduomo eds., 2009).  Because industry is so limited in Nigeria, there is 
very little demand for gas.  Id. at 50–51. 
 108 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CHOP FINE: THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT OF 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION AND MISMANAGEMENT IN RIVERS STATE, NIGERIA 
20 (2007), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria0107[1].pdf [hereinafter CHOP 
FINE].  See also Karin Brulliard, In Oil-Rich Niger Delta, the Sun Never Sets, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 30, 2009, A14; Ofeibea Quist-Arcton, Gas Flaring Disrupts Life in Oil-
Producing Niger Delta, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 24, 2007), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12175714. 
 109 Marcus O. Edino, et al., Perceptions and Attitudes Towards Gas Flaring 
in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. 30 ENVIRONMENTALIST 67, 68 (2010). 
 110 Id.  Nigeria burns more gas than any country except Russia.  See Brulliard, 
supra note 108. 
 111 Id; see supra Part I.A; see also ANDREW SIMMS & HANNAH REID, AFRICA: 
UP IN SMOKE?, 20–21 (2005). 
 112 TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE, supra note 5, at 3. 
 113 Umukoro, supra note 107, at 53. 
 114 Edino, supra note 109, at 67; Umukoro, supra note 107, at 51.  That law 
was enforced by a Nigerian Federal High Court in 2005, but a legal loophole allows 
the federal government to grant an oil company a certificate permitting continued 
flaring.  Id.  See also Ibibia Worika, Energy Development and Utilization in Africa, in 
THE LAW OF ENERGY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 324, 338 (Adrian J. Bradbrook 
et al., eds. 2005). 
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ry parties constantly at odds are the MNCs and the local population.
115
  
The locals point to poor maintenance of the thousands of miles of 
pipeline, some of which were installed forty years ago and have long 
since rusted and begun to leak.
116
  When these poorly-maintained 
pipes do leak or burst, the locals allege that the MNC response is 
slow, and that in the past, it has taken weeks for leaks to be re-
paired.
117
  The MNCs point to vandalism by local militant groups, 
claiming that this purposeful intervening wrongdoing absolves the 
corporations of liability.
118
  Shell has publicly blamed 98 percent of 
spills from its pipelines on vandals,
119
 though how they allocate the 
fault with any precision is unclear.  The Nigerian federal government 
has historically tended to side with the MNCs against its own people, 
because oil is so fundamentally important to the national economy.
120
 
What has emerged from this blame game is a cyclical crisis.  Per-
sistent environmental damage to the region has united the local popu-
lation against the federal government and the MNCs.  What began as 
peaceful political opposition was forcefully repressed by the Nigerian 
government, eliciting increasingly violent responses from the local 
communities.
121
  Violence aimed at the oil companies and the state 
  
 115 Though hundreds of ethnic and religious fault lines divide the Nigerian 
population, lack of development in the Niger Delta, political oppression, and the 
federal government’s practice of aligning itself with the MNCs has in many ways had 
the effect of uniting the peoples of the Niger Delta against their perceived common 
enemy: the oil companies.  See Richard Moncrieff, Niger Delta Fumble, WALL ST. J., 
June 10, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124457823935199275.html. 
 116 Vidal, supra note 102. 
 117 Nossiter, supra note 99. 
 118 Vidal, supra note 102. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Jedrzej George Frynas & Kamel Mellahi, Political Risks as Firm-Specific 
(Dis)Advantages: Evidence on Transnational Oil Firms in Nigeria, 45 THUNDERBIRD 
INT’L BUS. REV. 541, 550–51 (2003); Kenneth Omeje, Petrobusiness and Security 
Threats in the Niger Delta, Nigeria, 54 CURRENT SOC. 477, 479 (2006) (“[I]n a bid to 
protect its equity interests, the oil-dependent Nigerian state usually intervenes in 
favour of petrobusiness using sundry legislations, public policy and military reprisal 
in trying to resolve the conflict between the oil companies and their host communi-
ties.”). 
 121 The head of this peaceful resistance in the early 1990s was activist Ken 
Saro-Wiwa, leader of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), 
a mass-based minority rights organization.  G.N.K Vukor-Quarshie, Criminal Justice 
Administration in Nigeria: Saro-Wiwa in Review, CRIM. L. F., Oct. 1997, at 87, 88–
90.  Wiwa primarily attempted to raise awareness about the environmental degrada-
tion done in the Delta by oil companies and about lack of local representation in re-
source-related decisions.  Id.  At that time the Nigerian state was governed by a mili-
tary dictatorship that dealt harshly with opposition, particularly in an area as econom-
ically critical to the nation as the Delta.  Id.  Saro-Wiwa and a number of his fellow 
leaders were arrested, “tried” and executed in such rapid succession that their execu-
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has not only increased the pollution in the region, but also decreased 
the willingness of the government and oil companies to negotiate with 
the locals-turned-militants.
122
  The violence also distracts from the 
underlying issues: the abject poverty and terrible health consequences 
that the average Delta resident must endure. 
Nigerian federal regulatory mechanisms for the economy and en-
vironment are very weak due to a combination of lack of capacity and 
lack of political will.  MNCs therefore effectively operate with impu-
nity.
123
  The oil revenues that the federal government remit to the state 
and local governments have largely been squandered due to a com-
plete lack of accountability regarding how government revenues are 
spent once they are redistributed.
124
  With their political and adminis-
  
tion was clearly planned from the moment they were apprehended.  Such a reaction 
by the state to peaceful political protest was a catalyst for the more violent responses 
that followed, and the militarization of the groups opposing the presence of the 
MNCs.  Id.  The British government publicly condemned Saro-Wiwa’s execution, and 
suspended Nigeria from the Commonwealth in 1995.  See IKE OKONTA, WHEN 
CITIZENS REVOLT: NIGERIAN ELITES, BIG OIL, AND THE OGONI STRUGGLE FOR SELF-
DETERMINATION 4 (2008).  These events also eventually gave rise to litigation in the 
United States under the Alien Tort Claims Act, which is discussed in Part IV.B of this 
Note.  Nigerian nationals brought suit against Shell in US federal court for the oil 
company’s alleged involvement in the imprisonment and execution of Saro-Wiwa and 
his fellow leaders.  See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 
2000).  In 2009, Shell agreed to settle with the plaintiffs in Wiwa for $15.5 million.  
Jad Mouawad, Shell to Pay $15.5 Million to Settle Nigerian Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 
2009, at B1. 
 122 Because oil is so vital to the national economy, “[t]he government sees the 
activities of the protesting oil communities and the armed militias as acts of economic 
sabotage to the main source of national revenues and a challenge to its power in the 
Niger Delta.”  Cyril Obi, Nigeria’s Niger Delta: Understanding the Complex Drivers 
of Violent Oil-Related Conflict, 34 AFR. DEV. 103, 107 (2009).  This has raised the 
stakes dramatically in any confrontation between militants and the government, and 
has made the government more prone to adverse action rather than cooperation.  Id. 
 123 Odinkalu, supra note 97, at 200; see Rogge, supra note 88, at 314. 
 124 An estimated $380 billion in public funds were stolen by government 
officials between 1960 – 1999.  CHOP FINE, supra note 108, at 16.  Former governors 
Peter Odili and James Ibori, the former of Rivers State and the latter of Delta State, 
are accused of the theft of billions of dollars during their terms in office.  Id.  See also 
Nigeria Ex-Governor James Ibori Arrested in Dubai, BBC NEWS (May 13, 2010, 4:28 
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8680569.stm.  Though no charges have yet 
been brought against Odili, money laundering charges against Ibori have been filed in 
the United Kingdom.  Id.  Ibori was arrested in Dubai in May 2010, and his extradi-
tion to the UK was approved in October 2010.  Nigerian Ex-Governor Faces Extradi-
tion from Dubai to UK, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2010 11:27 AM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11986056.  Ibori was subsequently found 
guilty of ten counts of money laundering, and has been sentenced to thirteen years in 
the United Kingdom.  Former Nigeria Governor James Ibori Jailed for 13 Years, 
BBC NEWS (Apr. 17, 2012, 1:08 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
17739388. 
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trative avenues foreclosed, the only way local groups have found to 
actually affect change has been through violence.
125
  Unfortunately, 
this militarized response, which has typically involved blowing up 
pipelines and causing leaks, is then used by the MNCs to escape lia-
bility for pollution.
126
  Pipeline vandalism is certainly responsible for 
some of the Delta oil spills, but so long as the MNCs can hide behind 
militants to avoid responsibility for any wrongdoing, violent respons-
es will continue, and the cyclical crisis will repeat itself. 
Resolution of the armed conflict in the Niger Delta has as much to 
do with properly-timed action as with the substantive changes that 
will facilitate that resolution.  Intermittent conflict has plagued the 
region for decades,
127
 and the fractionalized, guerilla nature of the 
armed groups involved means that placating one contingent may have 
little impact on the overall level of violence.
128
  Still, a number of 
ceasefires, most recently in July 2009, have been negotiated between 
the government and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger 
Delta (MEND), the region’s largest militant group.129  Ceasefire and 
  
 125 Though pipeline vandalism hasn’t had any real impact on how the MNCs 
operate in the region, it has impacted the profit margins of the MNCs.  Though Nige-
ria’s oil exports are considerable, they could actually be much higher but-for the 
instability in the region that has caused MNCs to shut in production.  See EIA 
COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEF, supra note 1, at 2.  Further complicating the security 
environment, Delta militant groups have taken to kidnapping foreign oil workers for 
ransom.  See Nicholas Schmidle, The Hostage Business, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 4, 
2009, at MM14.  The increased frequency of hostage-taking “has also made oil and 
gas service companies increasingly reluctant to dispatch personnel to repair sabotaged 
or ruptured pipelines.”  ALEX IANNACCONE, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., 
TOWARD A REFORM AGENDA FOR THE NIGER DELTA 2 (2007), available at 
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070423_nigerdelta.pdf.  Because the Nigerian 
state is unable to adequately control the security environment, oil companies provide 
their own security, often by arming local gangs on a contract basis.  While arguably 
serving a purpose, this practice draws more young people into the conflict, and injects 
more weapons into a region fraught with firearms.  Omeje, supra note 120, at 478, 
487. 
 126 These causation problems, in the context of establishing tort liability, will 
be discussed infra, at Part IV.C.2. 
 127 Judith Burdin Asuni, Understanding the Armed Groups of the Niger Delta 
5–6 (Council on Foreign Relations, Working Paper, Sept. 2009), available at 
http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/understanding-armed-groups-niger-delta/p20146. 
 128 Id. at 19; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, POLITICS AS WAR: THE HUMAN 
RIGHTS IMPACT AND CAUSES OF POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE IN RIVERS STATE, NIGERIA 
54 (2008), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria0308webwcover.pdf. 
 129 Nigerian Rebels Declare Ceasefire, BBC NEWS (July 15, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8150965.stm; Joe DeCapua, Nigeria’s Niger Delta 
Called Pacified, VOICE OF AMERICA (Dec. 28, 2010, 7:00 PM), 
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/offor-decapua-niger-delta-29dec10-
112602459.html.   
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peace are not synonymous, however.
130
  Peace is a broad, long-term, 
comprehensive process, of which a ceasefire is a critical, but singular 
part.
131
  If no real efforts to solve the underlying problems follow the 
ceasefire, relapse into the status quo ante is inevitable.  Such was the 
case with the July 2009 ceasefire: by January 2010, the militants had 
released a statement ending the truce, citing the federal government’s 
failure to take meaningful action with respect to Delta grievances as 
the impetus for the resumption of hostilities.
132
 
The Nigerian government has explicitly refused international as-
sistance in mediating the Delta conflict, preferring to handle the mili-
tant movement as purely an internal, domestic matter.
133
  With certain 
political avenues foreclosed, an alternative means to satisfy the mar-
ginalized residents of the Niger Delta is necessary.  Though the major-
ity of Delta residents do not directly participate in the violence and 
vandalism, many are frustrated enough to believe that “the enemy of 
my enemy is my friend,” and thereby tacitly support the militants.134  
Financially compensating these residents for harms suffered due to oil 
extraction could help eliminate local support for violence.
135
  This 
compensation could best begin is best obtained in the courtroom. 
  
 130 Conflict resolution is a complex, multi-step process.  Ceasefires/cessations 
of hostilities, while obviously a critical part of the process, are only one step.  If a 
ceasefire isn’t followed up by negotiations, peace agreements, and legitimate efforts 
by parties to the conflict to reconcile their differences and address the underlying 
problems that precipitated the violence, relapse into violence is far more likely than 
progress towards peace.  See OLIVER RAMSBOTHAM ET AL., CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 11–14 (2005). 
 131 Id. 
            132 Nigeria Militants ‘End Truce in Delta Region’, BBC NEWS (Jan. 30, 2010, 2:50 
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8488772.stm. 
 133 DAVID SMOCK, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, CRISIS IN THE NIGER DELTA 6 (2009), 
available at http://www.usip.org/files/resources/niger_delta_crisis.pdf.  History indi-
cates that this insistence may be ill-advised.  As of 2008, fifteen separate attempts, 
beginning in 1958, have been made by committees which have recommended ways to 
address and solve the problems in the Niger Delta.  The problems are still ongoing, 
indicating that none of these efforts proved fruitful—and that a change in tactics 
might be necessary.  TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON THE NIGER DELTA, REPORT OF THE 
TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON THE NIGER DELTA 14 (2008). 
 134 See Asuni, supra note 127, at 22. 
 135 Many commentators on the violence in the Niger Delta have characterized 
the militant movement as an insurgency.  See, e.g., Ukoha Ukiwo, From “Pirates” to 
“Militants”: A Historical Perspective on Anti-State and Anti-Oil Company Mobiliza-
tion Among the Ijaw of Warri, Western Niger Delta, 106 AFR. AFF. 587, 590 (2007).  
A central tenet of counterinsurgency theory is that defeating a movement that has 
local support requires targeting the political grievances that fuel the insurgency.  Eliot 
Cohen et al., Principles, Imperatives and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency, MILITARY 
REV., Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 49, 50.  Rather than killing every insurgent, targeting the 
roots causes the movement to “die on the vine.”  Id.  See also James D. Fearon & 
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IV. LITIGATING A SOLUTION 
 
As soon as the Exxon Valdez ran aground and the Deepwater 
Horizon rig exploded, the public condemnation of Exxon and BP, 
respectively, began in earnest.  Because these tragedies occurred so 
close to home, the American people, media, and government regis-
tered their complaints swiftly and loudly.
136
  The outpouring of out-
rage by the American media against BP has in turn triggered an out-
pouring of outrage by Nigerians who have dealt with similar and 
worse oil spills for decades with little or no public attention or con-
demnation.
137
 
 
A. Domestic Suits against MNCs under Nigerian Law 
 
1. The Nigerian Judicial System 
 
Discussion of potential litigation against an MNC in Nigeria must 
begin with a brief description of the Nigerian judiciary.
138
  Popular 
expectations of the Nigerian legal system are low, for a variety of 
reasons.  Though a comprehensive judicial structure is in place,
139
 and 
there are constitutional and statutory provisions for individual rights 
and legal procedures, “the troubling legacies of military rule, especial-
ly corruption, executive control and manipulation of the judiciary, 
continue to undermine the ability of courts to effectively secure fair 
trial rights.”140  There have been more successful military coups in 
Nigeria than in any other African country.
141
  Years of intermittent 
  
David D. Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 75, 80 
(2003) (“Recruiting young men to the life of a guerrilla is easier when the economic 
alternatives are worse.”). 
 136 Clifford Krauss et al., White House Tries to Regroup as Criticism Mounts 
Over Leak, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2010, at A1; Anna Driver & Matthew Bigg, BP 
Swamped by Criticism, REUTERS (May 21, 2010), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6430AR20100521. 
 137 Vidal, supra note 102; Nossiter, supra note 99; Christian Purefoy, Nigeri-
ans Angry at Oil Pollution Double Standards, CNN.COM (June 30, 2010, 7:33 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/06/29/nigeria.oil/index.html. 
 138 See generally JEDRZEJ GEORG FRYNAS, OIL IN NIGERIA: CONFLICT AND 
LITIGATION BETWEEN OIL COMPANIES AND VILLAGE COMMUNITIES 92–94 (2000). 
 139 See Odinkalu, supra note 97, at 196. 
 140 Okechukwu Oko, Seeking Justice in Transitional Societies: An Analysis of 
the Problems and Failures of the Judiciary in Nigeria, 31 BROOK. J. INT. LAW 9, 14 
(2005).  
 141 MONTY G. MARSHALL, CTR. FOR SYSTEMIC PEACE, CONFLICT TRENDS IN 
AFRICA, 1946-2004: A MACRO-COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 53–61 (2005), available at 
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military interference in politics have left the judiciary institutionally 
weak and purposely underdeveloped.
142
  Rather than allowing for in-
stitutional checks and balances, “successive military regimes . . . abol-
ished the powers of the courts to inquire into any action or decision of 
the government.”143 
Additionally, during their colonial period, the British imposed le-
gal traditions on Nigeria with little regard for how European institu-
tional formalities translated to the Nigerian setting.
144
  The result has 
been a growing alienation of the poor and illiterate majority from a 
legal process that is expensive, inaccessible, and perceived as protect-
ing only the interests of urban elites.
145
  Though the Nigerian constitu-
tion requires the legislature to provide indigent citizens with access to 
legal representation,
146
 legal services are predominately located in 
urban areas, and “are arguably beyond the reach of a majority of the 
population.”147 
Nigerian government institutions have had more trouble with cor-
ruption than most,
148
 and the judicial system is no exception.  The 
  
http://www.systemicpeace.org/Conflict%20Trends%20in%20Africa.pdf.  Nigeria has 
been ruled by military regimes for 31 of the 51 years since its independence in 1960.  
Chinonye Obiagwu & Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, Nigeria: Combatting Legacies of 
Colonialism and Militarism, in HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONS 211, 
212 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im ed., 2003).  These military regimes have been 
described as “often brutal and mostly inefficient.”  CLARKE, supra note 73, at 84. 
 142 Oko, supra note 140, at 14. 
 143 Obiagwu & Odinkalu, supra note 141, at 212–13. 
 144 The British utilized an indirect rule system in the majority of their colo-
nies.  Indirect rule was characterized by attempts to preserve traditional authority to 
carry out the majority of government functions thereby gaining legitimacy by cooper-
ating with locals and preserving native custom.  In implementing this strategy in 
Nigeria, the British created parallel court systems: colonial courts applying British 
law for matters in which Crown subjects were involved, and a separate system to 
adjudicate disputes between Nigerians.  The result was “extensive confusion as to the 
appropriate forum for disputes as well as the relevant sources of legal authority.”  
Ronald J. Daniels, et al., The Legacy of Empire: The Common Law Inheritance and 
Commitments to Legality in Former British Colonies, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 111, 133 
(2011). 
 145 Okechukwu Oko, The Problems and Challenges of Lawyering in Develop-
ing Societies. 35 RUTGERS L. J. 569, 605–06 (2004). 
 146 CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), §§ 46(4)(a)–(b). 
 147 Odinkalu, supra note 97, at 198. 
 148 Transparency International, an international non-governmental organiza-
tion that monitors perceptions of corporate and political corruption by country, ranked 
Nigeria 143/182 according to its 2011 index.  On a scale of 0-10, with 0 being Highly 
Corrupt and 10 being Clean, Nigeria was rated at a 2.4.  TRANSPARENCY INT’L, 
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2011 at 3(Dec. 2011), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results.  See 
also Nigeria’s Struggle with Corruption: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Africa, 
Global Human Rights and International Operations of the H. Comm. on International 
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average Nigerian sees the courts not as “impartial dispensers of jus-
tice,” but rather as “auctioneers . . . willing to distort legal principles 
and established legal rules in favor of the highest bidder.”149  Nigerian  
“[c]itizens, lawyers, and even eminent jurists now openly 
acknowledge that the judicial system is no longer a realistic forum for 
obtaining justice, especially for citizens who lack the resources and 
social connections to influence the outcome of the judicial proceed-
ings.”150  Judges are also poorly paid, which makes some even more 
susceptible to bribe-taking.
151
  The meagerness of judicial salaries has 
also traditionally discouraged otherwise-prominent, well-qualified 
Nigerian jurists from seeking judicial appointments.
152
 
It may take five to six years for a case to be heard in a Nigerian 
superior court, and those cases that are eventually heard proceed with 
no real sense of urgency.
153
  Court facilities are “hopelessly over-
crowded, badly equipped, and underfunded” and a lack of “computers, 
photocopiers, or other modern equipment [means that] judges may 
even have to supply their own paper and pen to record their judgment 
in longhand.”154  In the 1960s, when the current evidentiary and pro-
cedural rules were developed, a judge in Lagos, Nigeria’s most popu-
lous city, might hear six cases per week.
155
  In 2003, the docket list for 
a judge in that same position was one hundred cases per day.
156
  Com-
pounding this already-incredible problem, when a judge is transferred 
“and a new one takes over a case [the action] has to start de novo.”157 
The legal system’s lack of technology also impairs the already-
uncertain rights of individuals to due process.  Presentation of tech-
  
Relations, 109th Cong. 109-172 (2006) (statement of Rep. Smith, Chairman, Sub-
comm. on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations). 
 149 Oko, supra note 145, at 633. 
 150 Oko, supra note 140, at 16. See also J.N.C. Hill, Corruption in the Courts: 
the Achilles Heel of Nigeria’s Regulatory Framework?, 31 THIRD WORLD Q. 1161, 
1172 (2010) (“The common, and largely correct, view is that, far from holding the 
rich and powerful in check, the judiciary actively colludes with them.”). 
 151 Oko, supra note 140, at 79–80.  In addition to judges being susceptible to 
bribery, other necessary court officers—registrars, legal assistants, clerks—are even 
more poorly and infrequently compensated.  People in these positions have openly 
extorted money from litigants.  Obiagwu & Odinkalu, supra note 141, at 237. 
 152 Obiagwu & Odinkalu, supra note 141, at 237. 
 153 Oko, supra note 140, at 39. 
 154 Id. at 42 (quoting HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF OIL: CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA’S OIL PRODUCING 
COMMUNITIES 143 (1999)). 
 155 Obiagwu & Odinkalu, supra note 141, at 233. 
 156 Id. at 234. 
 157 Damfebo K. Derri, Litigation Problems in Compensation Claims for Oil 
and Gas Operations in Nigeria, in LAW AND PETROLEUM INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA: 
CURRENT CHALLENGES, 11, 22 (Festus Emiri & Gowon Deinduomo eds., 2009). 
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nical evidence is often extremely difficult, if not impossible, and that 
impedes the ability of the party bearing the burden of proof (typically 
the plaintiff) to present his or her case completely.
158
  This evidentiary 
problem is particularly relevant to oil spill-related claims for which 
scientific testimony on the exact harm done to property or individuals 
must be demonstrated.
159
  Additionally, Nigerian law requires that 
expert witnesses be “specially skilled in the particular field in ques-
tion,” and courts have refused to admit expert testimony based on 
doubts about the expert’s skill.160  Finding qualified expert witnesses, 
then, is an additional cost on top of an already-expensive litigation 
process.
161
  These obstacles have “the obvious consequence of alienat-
ing the public from, and reducing their confidence in, the justice sys-
tem, and indeed, the democratic process.”162 
Aside from these practical obstacles, a number of procedural par-
ticularities exist within the Nigerian judicial system that further com-
plicate suits.  Jurisdiction of trial courts, standing of individuals to 
bring suit, and joinder of parties are viewed as so fundamental to the 
adjudication process that a party challenging any of these has a consti-
tutional right to an interlocutory appeal, all the way to the Nigerian 
Supreme Court, before any other legal issue may be decided.
163
  
Standing is assessed by trial judges on a case-by-case basis, and par-
ties alleging separate injuries may not be joined.
164
  The prevailing 
doctrinal position in Nigerian courts in regards to standing is that a 
  
 158 Oko, supra note 140, at 44. 
 159 Omolaji Adewale, Oil Spill Claims in Nigeria: Principles, Guidelines and 
Criteria, 33 J. AFR. L. 91, 93 (1989). 
 160 FRYNAS, supra note 138, at 200.  For example, in an oil spill case before a 
Nigerian court, the plaintiffs’ expert “had specialist knowledge as a soil scientist and 
an agronomist” but “[h]is testimony was not considered credible as he did not have 
additional knowledge of radiation and heat.”  Id. 
 161 Id. at 200–01. 
 162 Oko, supra note 140, at 80. 
 163 Odinkalu, supra note 97, at 188. 
 164 The Nigerian legal system approaches standing a very paradoxical manner.  
The great weight given to standing would seem to indicate that the legal system could 
benefit greatly from an unambiguous, bright-line rule determining when suits may be 
filed, and by whom.  However, the leading Nigerian case dealing with standing, was 
decided almost three decades ago, and the court’s language was ambiguous.  The test 
articulated was that “standing will only be accorded to a plaintiff who shows that his 
civil rights and obligations have been or are in danger of being violated or adversely 
affected by the act complained of.”  See Jedrzej George Frynas, Legal Change in 
Africa: Evidence from Oil-Related Litigation in Nigeria, 43 J. AFR. L. 121, 132 
(1999).  The court however failed to define “civil rights and obligations,” and to this 
day this lack of clarity provides the grounds for the interlocutory appeals which delay 
legal proceedings.  See Tunde Ogowewo, The Problem with Standing to Sue in Nige-
ria, 39 J. AFR. L. 1, 3–4 (1995). 
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litigant must have a personal interest in the matter—which “precludes 
the purist of impact litigation for the public interest.”165  This means 
that human rights activists cannot sue on behalf of injured groups.
166
  
This personal interest has been interpreted to mean one “over and 
above that of the general public,” so the interest of a particular indi-
vidual must be greater than that of any other.
167
  Paradoxically, then, if 
the harm alleged is one that affects a community en masse (for exam-
ple, an oil spill)—it is possible that no single individual has a legally 
sufficient personal interest to fulfill the standing requirement.
168
  Too 
many people’s interests have been impaired for any one of them to 
assert a legal cause of action.  Consequently, when it is a defendant, 
the government’s automatic reflex is to challenge the jurisdiction, 
standing, and/or joinder of the plaintiffs.
169
  This suspends and delays 
the proceedings, often to such an extent that the plaintiffs are finan-
cially precluded from going forward. 
Finally, even if a final decision is rendered by a court, “there is no 
guarantee of enforcement or compliance.”170  While the role of any 
judiciary in deciding what the law is, and how it applies to a particular 
scenario is critical, absent enforcement mechanisms, those decisions 
are meaningless.  This is true in any context, but in Nigeria, statutory 
authority for enforcement of judgments is wholly vested in the federal 
Attorney-General whenever government assets are at issue.
171
  The 
government must therefore decide to punish itself; not surprisingly, 
Attorneys-General “routinely decline such consent.”172 
 
2. Litigation Against Oil Companies in Nigerian 
Courts 
 
Despite the considerable procedural obstacles, a number of suits 
against oil companies have been tried in Nigerian courts, with mixed 
results.  Several Nigerian statutes technically govern the actions of oil 
companies, notably the Petroleum Drilling and Production Regulation 
  
 165 Odinkalu, supra note 97, at 198. 
 166 Obiagwu & Odinkalu, supra note 141, at 233. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. 
 169 These delays are considerable, and litigation can often last for more than a 
decade. Odinkalu, supra note 97, at 188–89; see Frynas, supra note 164, at 132. 
 170 Odinkalu, supra note 97, at 190. 
 171 Sheriffs and Civil Process Act (1990) Cap. (407), §§ 84(1)–(3) (Nigeria); 
see also Odinkalu, supra note 97, at 190. 
 172 Odinkalu, supra note 97, at 190. 
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Act of 1969 (Petroleum Act) and the Oil Pipelines Act of 1956.
173
  
Regulation 25 of the Petroleum Act states that: 
 
The licensee . . . shall adopt all practicable precautions, in-
cluding the provision of up-to-date equipment . . . to prevent the 
pollution of inland waters, rivers, watercourses . . . or the high seas 
by oil, mud or other . . . substances which might contaminate the 
water, banks or shoreline or which might cause harm . . . to fresh 
water or marine life, and where any such pollution occurs or has 
occurred, shall take prompt steps to control and, if possible, end 
it.
174
 
 
Despite affirmatively assigning monitoring and clean-up respon-
sibilities to the oil companies in exchange for drilling licenses, the 
Petroleum Act includes no penalties for nonperformance.
175
  It has 
therefore failed to provide legal protection for victims of oil spills. 
The Oil Pipelines Act establishes that individuals “whose land . . . 
may be injuriously affected by the grant of a [drilling] licence may 
within the period specified . . . lodge verbally or in writing . . . notice 
of objection stating the interest of the objector and the grounds of ob-
jection,” technically granting ordinary citizens a voice in oil opera-
tions.
176
  It also enumerates a broad range of damage options available 
to individuals for harm caused by oil operations, including for: 
 
(a) any damage done to any buildings, crops or profitable trees 
by the holder of the licence in the exercise of the rights conferred 
by the licence; and 
(b) any disturbance caused by the holder in the exercise of 
such rights; and 
(c) any damage suffered by any person by reason of any ne-
glect on the part of the holder or his agents, servants or workmen 
to protect, maintain or repair any work, structure or thing executed 
under the licence; and 
(d) any damage suffered by any person . . . as a consequence 
of any breakage of or leakage from the pipeline or an ancillary in-
stallation; and 
  
 173 Petroleum Act (1990) Cap. 350 (Nigeria), available at http://www.nigeria-
law.org/Petroleum%20Act.htm [hereinafter Petroleum Act]; Oil Pipelines Act (1990) 
Cap. 338 (Nigeria), available at http://www.nigeria-
law.org/Oil%20Pipelines%20Act.htm [hereinafter Oil Pipelines Act]. 
 174 Petroleum Act §9.25. 
 175 Simon Warikiyei Amaduobogha, Environmental Regulation of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) in the Oil and Gas Sector, in LAW AND PETROLEUM 
INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA: CURRENT CHALLENGES, 115, 120 (Festus Emiri & Gowon 
Deinduomo eds., 2009). 
 176 Oil Pipelines Act § 9. 
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(e) loss (if any) in value of the land or interests in land by rea-
son of the exercise of the rights as aforesaid.
177
 
 
These statutory provisions outlawing pollution and providing for ad-
ministrative recourse and monetary compensation for victims, histori-
cally, have not meant much in practice.  Prior to the 1990s, tort litiga-
tion efforts by Nigerians against oil companies were almost wholly 
unsuccessful.
178
 
In addition to the general procedural difficulties discussed above, 
in negligence tort actions in Nigeria, the burden of proof is on the 
plaintiff to establish that the defendant “owes him/her a duty of care, 
that the duty was breached and that damage resulted from the breach 
of duty.”179  Proving negligence has traditionally been very difficult 
for plaintiffs because of the technical specifics of oil operations, in 
part because defendant oil companies have a decided informational 
advantage.
180
  Individual plaintiffs often do not know what exactly has 
gone wrong—just that a pipeline has leaked and turned their land into 
an oil slick—and this information gap means that most cases are won 
by defendant oil companies.
181
  
Plaintiffs have attempted to bring damage claims based on strict 
liability, but with very limited success.  The “precedent” most favora-
ble to Nigerian plaintiffs in strict liability actions is the British case 
Rylands v. Fletcher, where the House of Lords found that when a per-
son has on his land “anything likely to do mischief if it escapes . . . 
[he] is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural 
consequence of its escape.”182  Plaintiffs were successful against Shell 
in one instance under this theory.  One of Shell’s oil waste pits was 
allowed to overflow, resulting in substantial damage to the plaintiffs’ 
farmland and pond.
183
  Because the plaintiff’s burden of proof in a 
strict liability case is just that damage was done, this would seem an 
attractive legal option for plaintiffs who seek damages for pipelines 
that are poorly maintained and thereby create the dangerous circum-
stance.
184
   
  
 177 Id. at § 20. 
 178 Kaniye S.A. Ebeku, Judicial Attitudes to Redress for Oil-Related Envi-
ronmental Damage in Nigeria. 12 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL L. 199, 202 
(2003). 
 179 Frynas, supra note 164, at 123. 
 180 Id. at 124. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Rylands v. Fletcher [1868] L.R. 3 H.L.330. 
 183 Frynas, supra note 164, at 126–27. 
 184 Rylands, L.R. 3 H.L.330. 
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But imposition of strict liability is subject to a number of excep-
tions.
185
  These exceptions include consent, statutory authority, “acts 
of God,” and third-party intervention.186  Consent by the plaintiff and 
statutory authority to perform the inherently dangerous act negate 
strict liability in tort.
187
  Acts of God, analogous to the American 
“forces of nature” exception to strict liability, similarly exempt a de-
fendant from liability for otherwise tortious conduct.
188
  The primary 
defense utilized by MNCs, however, is third-party intervention (e.g., 
vandalism).
189
  If an oil company can establish that a third party sabo-
taged pipeline operations, it is not liable for the resulting damages.
190
  
Oil companies have successfully defended a number of lawsuits by 
asserting this sabotage defense.
191
 
Even plaintiffs capable of navigating the Nigerian procedural 
maze successfully enough to litigate a full trial rarely get the verdicts 
they seek.  Injunctions have been sought in a number of actions with 
negligible success.
192
  Judges, under considerable political pressure, 
consistently find that the state’s economic interest in the revenues 
generated by oil exports far outweighs any negative impact industry 
practices may have had on citizens.
193
  Accordingly, they have tradi-
tionally declined to take any action that would impose liability on 
Nigeria’s foreign partners, despite statutory provisions that explicitly 
prohibit or regulate MNC operations.
194
   
Nevertheless, since the 1990s, Nigerian courts have made better 
efforts to enforce the law, and have, in a handful of cases, awarded 
monetary damages to plaintiffs injured by the oil companies.
195
  These 
favorable verdicts are not necessarily synonymous with successes, 
however, because the damage awards have been comparatively small.  
Damage awards have been for short-term, individual compensation 
only (e.g., for the monetary value of crops damaged by an oil spill), 
not, for instance, for long-term environmental or health damages 
  
 185 FRYNAS, supra note 138, at 196. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id.   
 188 Id. at 195–96; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 510 (1977). 
 189 FRYNAS, supra note 138, at 196. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. at 189–90 (“Nigerian courts are very reluctant to grant an injunction in 
oil-related cases.  For oil companies, this interpretation of the law…is favourable 
because the law allows them to continue with their exploration and production activi-
ties, notwithstanding the adverse impact of oil operations on village communities.”). 
 193 Frynas, supra note 164, at 127. 
 194 Ebeku, supra note 178, at 202. 
 195 Jedrzej George Frynas, Social and Environmental Litigation Against 
Transnational Firms in Africa, 42 J. MODERN AFR. STUD. 363, 371–73 (2004). 
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caused by contamination of drinking water.
196
  The prevailing stand-
ard—”fair and adequate compensation”—covers only proven, quanti-
fiable compensatory damages, and does not account for loss of future 
earnings, pain and suffering, or any of the other categories of tort 
damages available in the United States.
197
  Until 1997, no award of 
damages for oil-related legal action in a Nigerian court was greater 
than $275,000.
198
  When contrasted with the billions of dollars paid by 
Exxon and BP for their respective spills,
199
 it is clear that Nigerian 
damage awards are inadequate, and pale in comparison to the magni-
tude of harm and the amount of effort required to prevail in a lawsuit. 
Some commentators have written very favorably about the impli-
cations of these rare legal successes,
200
 but the ratio of successful 
plaintiffs to victims indicates that this optimism is premature.  For 
practical and procedural reasons, the number of individuals able to 
persevere in the Nigerian judicial system is very small, particularly in 
relation to the number of individuals who have been harmed.  Many 
never consider legal recourse in the first place, because the judicial 
system just seems too inaccessible.
201
  Furthermore, the small damage 
awards that MNCs have been ordered to pay have not been nearly 
harsh enough to encourage more responsible operational practices.
202
  
Moreover, compensation after the fact can only do so much good.  It 
would be better to prevent the harmful conduct in the first place, but 
history indicates that the Nigerian judicial system is unwilling to bite 
the hand that feeds, and impose any legitimate penalties on MNCs.   
Though the Nigerian legal system should by no means be treated 
as a lost cause, at present, it is not the most viable road to recovery for 
victims of oil spills in the Niger Delta who are suffering real damage 
in real time.  And the increasingly violent responses of the local popu-
  
 196 Ebeku, supra note 178, at 207.  In the instances where the oil companies 
have agreed to compensate spill victims, they have provided money for immediate 
economic losses, but have failed to undertake environmental remediation efforts 
necessary to mitigate future losses.  Id. at 204–05.  So although arable farmland may 
have been destroyed by toxic exposure to crude oil, the big-picture concerns (how the 
plaintiff will make his living next year or 10 years later) are ignored, and payment is 
only made for short-term losses.  Id. 
 197 Frynas, supra note 164, at 139.  Further, there is no established definition 
for “fair and adequate compensation,” leaving the courts to decide on a case-by-case 
basis what this term means.  Derri, supra note 157, at 19. 
 198 Frynas, supra note 164, at 142. 
 199 See supra Part II. 
 200 See Frynas, supra note 164, at 121. 
 201 See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text. 
 202 Ebeku, supra note 178, at 199, 206–07 (exploring, and ultimately disa-
greeing with Frynas’s theory that rulings by Nigerian judges demonstrated a shift in 
jurisprudence toward environmental protection). 
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lations to the errors and excesses of the oil companies indicate that 
waiting for the readiness of the Nigerian legal system may be too dan-
gerous.  Would-be Nigerian plaintiffs may therefore achieve more 
success by attempting to recover in foreign forums.  Nigerian plain-
tiffs have some experience litigating claims against oil companies 
abroad, both in the U.S and Europe.
203
  Nigerians may be able to liti-
gate in the United States, since federal courts can exercise jurisdiction 
via the Alien Tort Statute or common law long-arm statutes. 
 
B. U.S. Federal Tort Claims Under the Alien Tort 
Statute
204
 
 
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS), codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1350, was 
enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
205
  It states that “the dis-
trict courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an 
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.”206  This potentially very expansive statute 
then lay dormant for almost two centuries, until 1980, when it was 
invoked in modern litigation for the first time in Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala.
207
  In this landmark decision, the District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York heard arguments by Paraguayan nationals 
against the Paraguayan police for violation of human rights norms, 
after the plaintiffs’ son was allegedly tortured by the police.208  The 
district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, but the Second Circuit 
reversed, using a combination of international treaties and declara-
tions to find a sufficient customary international law basis to sustain 
  
 203 Three notable cases against foreign oil companies have been brought by 
Nigerians in the United States: Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 266 F.3d 88 (2d 
Cir. 2000); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2010); 
Bowoto v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1229 (N.D. Cal., 2004).  In 
2009, The Hague “decided that it was competent to...hear…a case filed for compensa-
tion for alleged damage from oil spills caused by Royal Dutch Shell’s Nigerian unit.”  
Jay Wagner & Kit Armstrong, Managing Environmental and Social Risks in Interna-
tional Oil and Gas Projects: Perspectives on Compliance, 3 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & 
BUS. 140, 156 (2010).  See also Catherine Hornby, Dutch Court to Take on Shell 
Nigeria Cases, REUTERS (Dec. 30, 2009, 12:23 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/30/us-shell-nigeria-
idUSTRE5BT1WL20091230. 
 204 The terms “Alien Tort Statute” and “Alien Tort Claims Act” are used 
interchangeably in case law and legal commentary.  
 205 BETH STEPHENS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. 
COURTS 1 (2008). 
 206 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2010). 
 207 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) 
 208 Id. at 878–80; see also JEFFREY DAVIS, JUSTICE ACROSS BORDERS: THE 
STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN U.S. COURTS 17–22 (2008). 
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an ATS claim.
209
  Human rights activists rejoiced at this interpretation 
of the all-but-forgotten statute, as it ostensibly provided an American 
forum for serious harms committed abroad, providing victims with an 
avenue for previously-unavailable recourse.
210
 
Some commentators worried, though, that the decision in Filarti-
ga would trigger a race to the courthouse by foreign plaintiffs.
211
  For 
the most part, this flood of litigation did not materialize,
212
 due to the 
statute’s ambiguity and a lack of clear legal precedent.  By 2004, no 
court had reached a judgment on the merits of an ATS case.
213
  In-
stead, the majority of ATS suits were dismissed in the early stages of 
litigation for procedural reasons, even when the plaintiffs had made a 
prima facie showing of subject matter jurisdiction.
214
 
So, even after the Second Circuit opened the door in Filartiga, the 
majority of circuits dismissed ATS cases, instead adopting the reason-
ing from the 1984 D.C. Circuit case, Tel Oren v. Libyan Arab Repub-
lic.
215
  In his separate concurrence to the per curiam opinion, Judge 
Bork criticized the decision in Filartiga as premature;
216
 absent an 
explicit congressional grant of a private right of action, the ATS did 
not afford foreign plaintiffs access to U.S. federal courts.
217
  The Se-
cond and Ninth Circuits, however, allowed a small number of ATS 
cases to proceed.
218
  Though only a few were allowed to proceed to 
  
 209 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 882. 
 210 STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 205, at 12. 
 211 Id.  
 212 Id.; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Separating Myth from Reality About 
Corporate Responsibility Litigation, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 263, 268 (2004) (“[T]here is 
no flood of cases…Given the 215 years of the ATS’s history, more than a dozen cases 
does not constitute a flood.”). 
 213 Koh, supra note 212, at 270. 
 214 Id. at 269.  When foreign state entities are involved, the state action doc-
trine and sovereign immunity are always invoked, usually successfully.  Under the 
state action doctrine, “courts ‘will generally refrain from…sitting in judgment 
on…acts of a governmental character done by a foreign state within its own territory . 
. . .’” JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: 
LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 211–12 (2006) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 443 (1987)).  Sovereign immunity, 
as codified in the United States by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 
provides that “foreign governments and their ‘agencies and instrumentalities’ will 
generally be immune from the jurisdiction of the US courts.”  ZERK, supra, at 213. 
 215 Tel Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d. 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(per curiam); DAVIS, supra note 204, at 23–24. 
 216 Tel Oren, 726 F.2d. at 799 (Bork, J., concurring). 
 217 Id. 
 218 DAVIS, supra note 208, at 24, 114–17.  Of the thirty-three cases charted by 
Davis, only nine were brought outside the Second and Ninth Circuits.  This is notable 
because ATS claims have primarily been brought against business entities for offens-
es committed overseas—and many of these entities are able to be served with process 
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judgment on the merits, the plaintiffs in those successful cases were 
awarded multimillion dollar judgments.
219
 
 
1. The Supreme Court and the Alien Tort     
Statute 
 
After more than two decades of judicial ambiguity following 
Filartiga, the Supreme Court heard its first ATS case in 2004.  In So-
sa v. Alvarez-Machain, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) hired Mexican citizens, including petitioner Jose Sosa, to ap-
prehend Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican national who had 
been indicted in California for the kidnapping, torture, and murder of 
a DEA agent.
220
  Alvarez-Machain was forcibly taken from his home 
in Mexico and flown to El Paso, Texas where he was taken into feder-
al custody.
221
  Alvarez-Machain was eventually acquitted, and he sub-
sequently filed tort claims against the United States and Sosa for false 
arrest and violation of the law of nations.
222
  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to address the ATS for the first time.
223
  Eighteen 
parties filed amicus briefs, underscoring the legal importance of the 
outcome, since the dispute was only over $25,000 in damages.
224
 
Ultimately, the Court held that the ATS is only a jurisdictional 
statute, “enacted on the understanding that the common law would 
provide a cause of action for the modest number of international law 
violations with a potential for personal liability at the time.”225  
Though agreeing that federal courts had constitutional authority to 
hear ATS cases, the Court cautioned that the class of international 
norms actionable under the ATS was narrow.
226
  Norms that triggered 
ATS jurisdiction must be clearly defined and universally accepted.
227
  
At the time the statute was enacted in 1789, the actions constituting 
violations of the laws of nations were “violations of safe conducts, 
  
in either New York or California because their headquarters or principal places of 
business are located there. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2010); see infra Part IV.B.4 for discus-
sion of corporations and the ATS. 
 219 STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 205, at 16. 
 220 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697–98 (2004). 
 221 Id. at 698. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. at 699. 
 224 DAVIS, supra note 208, at 25. 
 225 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724. 
 226 Id. at 732. 
 227 Id.; DAVIS, supra note 208, at 25. 
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infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.”228  In modern 
jurisprudence, then, “courts should require any claim based on the 
present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international character 
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity compa-
rable to the features [that] the 18th-century paradigms . . . recog-
nized.”229  For would-be ATS plaintiffs, then, the door to the court-
room was left “ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping.”230  The Court, 
however, did not purport to identify an exhaustive list of criteria for 
causes of action under the ATS,
231
 and the lower courts have struggled 
to determine the types of torts that trigger the ATS.
232
 
 
2. Political and Procedural Obstacles to    
Plaintiffs’ Successful Use of the Alien Tort 
Statute 
 
Commentators have been critical of litigation under the ATS, 
voicing both procedural and public policy concerns.  The backlog of 
federal cases brought by U.S. citizens is already substantial without 
allowing two foreign parties the opportunity to use U.S. forums when 
other equally viable forums exist.
233
  Further, application of interna-
tional law in U.S. courts, which ATS claims necessarily involve, is 
unpopular, most notably with conservative jurists.
234
   
  
 228 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.  See generally William S. Dodge, The Historical 
Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the “Originalists,” 19 HASTINGS 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221 (1996). 
 229 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.  In modern jurisprudence, then, the most egregious 
offenses (for instance, genocide, torture, summary execution, slavery/forced labor) 
are covered by the ATS, as these are some of the most widely recognized violations 
of international law, and are illegal essentially everywhere.  See also STEPHENS ET AL., 
supra note 201, at 139–70. 
 230 Sosa, 529 U.S. at 729. 
 231 Id.  See also Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort 
Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 542 (2011). 
 232 Bellia Jr. & Clark, supra note 231, at 464–65. 
 233 ATS suits tend to be very factually complicated, and because the events in 
question took place abroad, procedural delays are common.  Additionally, once plain-
tiffs are granted access to US forums, they are much more apt to pursue and appeal 
every potential legal option.  See, e.g. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 
88 (2d Cir. 2000) (the lawsuit was first filed in 1998, and wasn’t settled until 2009); 
In re Agent Orange Litigation, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (the lawsuit was 
first filed in 1979, and was finally dismissed in 2005). 
 234 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 749–50 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The notion that a 
law of nations, redefined to mean the consensus of states on any subject, can be used 
by a private citizen to control a sovereign’s treatment of its own citizens within its 
own territory is a 20th-century invention of internationalist law professors and human 
rights advocates.  The Framers would, I am confident, be appalled by the proposition 
that, for example, the American peoples’ democratic adoption of the death penalty 
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Private application of international law in U.S. courtrooms may 
also have significant foreign policy consequences.  Although plaintiffs 
in ATS cases are seeking private, monetary damages, courts are public 
actors.
235
  Accusations of crimes against humanity, for instance, are 
very serious, and an American judge’s opinion about whether or not 
those crimes occurred can have much more serious consequences than 
just the award or denial of monetary damages to an individual plain-
tiff.
236
  Constitutional separation of powers generally requires the ju-
diciary to defer to Congress and the Executive with respect to interna-
tional affairs.
237
  Granting U.S. judges expansive power to punish for-
eign citizens, and potentially foreign governments, was recognized by 
the Court in Sosa as constitutionally inappropriate.
238
   
Though violations of certain international norms technically allow 
foreign plaintiffs to bring cases in U.S. federal courts, ATS cases are 
procedurally very complex, and the vast majority are dismissed before 
evaluation of the merits.
239
  Sovereign immunity,
240
 the political ques-
tion doctrine,
241
 statutes of limitations,
242
 and forum non conveniens
243
 
have been successfully invoked by ATS defendants in support of dis-
missal, even if the violation alleged is one that would otherwise be 
allowed under the narrow, post-Sosa interpretation of the ATS.
244
  
Federal pleading requirements are stringent enough for domestic 
plaintiffs—and meeting the timely filing requirements and evidentiary 
  
could be judicially nullified because of the disapproving views of foreigners.”) (em-
phasis in original)(citations omitted). 
 235 Halina Ward, Securing Transnational Corporate Accountability Through 
National Courts: Implications and Policy Options, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 451, 459 (2001). 
 236 Id. at 459–60.  Domestic legal decisions involving international law al-
ways require consideration of international comity.  Though sometimes equated with 
sovereign immunity, in the United States, international comity more specifically 
“requires courts to balance competing public and private interests in a manner that 
takes into account any conflict between the public policies of the domestic and for-
eign sovereigns.”  Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of International Comity, 71 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROB. 19, 19 (2008).  It is a broad doctrine that includes the real-world 
considerations judges must weigh when deciding matters of international conse-
quence.  Id. at 19–20. 
 237 DAVIS, supra note 208, at 36. 
 238 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728–29. 
 239 STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 205, at 12. 
 240 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2010); see Republic 
of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004). 
 241 See Anderman v. Fed. Republic of Austria, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1118 
(C.D. Cal. 2003). 
 242 See Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 317 F. 3d 1005, 1028, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 243 See infra notes 274–85 and accompanying text. 
 244 STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 205, at 16. 
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burdens becomes exponentially more difficult when persons, infor-
mation, and materials must travel internationally.
245
 
 
3. Environmental Degradation and Right to 
Health Claims under the ATS 
 
What the decision in Sosa made clear is that only the most serious 
human rights violations are actionable under the ATS.  Though plain-
tiffs have attempted to utilize the ATS to recover damages for envi-
ronmental degradation or detrimental health impact, these efforts have 
been widely unsuccessful.
246
  The Sosa interpretation of the ATS, 
requiring a clear and specific violation of the law of nations, precludes 
use of many international environmental regulations—most of which 
are indefinite.
247
  For example, though the United States is party to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which 
proclaims rights to health and a healthy environment,
248
 the ICCPR 
was ratified by the Senate with the explicit reservation that it was not 
self-executing and did not create a private right of action in U.S. 
courts.
249
 
Particularly relevant to victims of oil spills who would seek to re-
cover under the ATS for detriment to health is the 2003 case, Flores v. 
Southern Peru Copper Corp., which preceded the limitations imposed 
by Sosa.
250
  In Flores, Peruvian plaintiffs sought personal injury dam-
ages under the ATS for illnesses and deaths caused by pollution from 
the defendant’s mines and refineries.251  The Southern District of New 
York dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 
  
 245 See FED R. CIV. P. 8. 
 246 STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 205, at 205.  U.S. courts have continuously 
dismissed ATS claims based on environmental damage.  See Beanal v. Freeport-
McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 163, 167 (5th Cir. 1999) (upholding dismissal of the 
plaintiff’s environmental torts claim, and noting that “federal courts should exercise 
extreme caution when adjudicating environmental claims under international law to 
insure that environmental policies of the United States do not dis-
place environmental policies of other governments.”). 
 247 Bradford Mank, Can Plaintiffs Use Multinational Environmental Treaties 
as Customary International Law to Sue Under the Alien Tort Statute?, 2007 UTAH L. 
REV. 1085, 1145 (2007). 
 248 International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171. 
 249 SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INT’L COVENANT ON CIVIL & 
POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23, at 14 (1992). 
 250 Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003).  Giv-
en the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ATS in Sosa, a right to health claim 
brought today would in all likelihood achieve the same unsuccessful outcome as in 
Flores. 
 251 Id. at 237. 
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the ATS, and the Second Circuit affirmed.
252
  Though the plaintiffs 
proffered numerous international declarations and conventions in 
which signatories affirmed rights to life and health, the court charac-
terized these rights as “vague and amorphous.”253  Rather than “‘clear 
and unambiguous’ rule[s] of customary international law,” the docu-
ments cited by the plaintiffs “proclaim[ed] only nebulous notions that 
[were] infinitely malleable.”254   
This precedent indicates that Nigerian plaintiffs may not be able 
to successfully utilize the ATS for personal injury suits for toxic ex-
posure to crude oil.
255
  ATS plaintiffs have met with little success 
even when alleging the most egregious offenses.  Moreover, there is a 
pronounced dearth of federal precedent supportive of private damages 
for violations of the international right to health and a healthy envi-
ronment.  Absent a shift in federal jurisprudence, it is unlikely the 
ATS can provide a road to recovery for victims of Nigerian oil spills. 
 
4. The Future of the ATS: The Corporate        
Liability Question 
 
However, a shift in federal jurisprudence may be on the horizon.  
The defendants in Sosa were not corporate entities, and the Supreme 
Court therefore was not required to, and did not, address whether cor-
porations could be liable under the ATS.
256
  Accordingly, the lower 
courts have once again been required to navigate the murky waters of 
ATS jurisprudence absent explicit guidance.  Corresponding nicely 
  
 252 Id. at 266. 
 253 Id. at 254. 
 254 Id. at 254–55 (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 
1980)).  The plaintiffs had cited to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  Though noting 
that those treaties “express virtuous goals,” the court expressly stated that “they do 
not meet the requirement of our law that rules of customary international law be clear, 
definite and unambiguous.”  Id. at 255. 
 255 Further proof of the unfriendliness of the US federal court system to right 
to health claims came in Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, where foreign plaintiffs alleged 
environmental abuses by the defendant mining company (in addition to allegations of 
war crimes).  221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 2002).  The court dismissed the 
right to health claim.  Id. at 1160. 
 256 Justice Souter acknowledged, in a widely-discussed footnote, a potential 
distinction between individuals and corporations in terms of ATS liability. Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n. 20 (2004) (“A related consideration is wheth-
er international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the 
perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or 
individual.”). 
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with this lack of explicit guidance has been an increasing frequency of 
high-profile corporations as named defendants in ATS lawsuits.
257
   
Major MNCs are attractive targets for ATS plaintiffs, as they have 
considerable assets, and are also ineligible for a number of the proce-
dural defenses (such as sovereign immunity) that have been utilized 
successfully by defendants seeking ATS dismissals.
258
  Though the 
status of MNCs in international law is by no means firmly established, 
legal commentators,
259
 judicial precedent,
260
 and simple logic
261
 seem 
to support the conclusion that “with great power comes great respon-
sibility.”262 
Arguably the most important ATS case litigated since Sosa has 
been Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum—in which the Second Circuit 
dealt with the question of corporate liability under the ATS head-on, 
and answered in the negative.
263
  Kiobel is only the second ATS case 
to reach the Supreme Court.  The Kiobel plaintiffs are Nigerian citi-
zens who claim that “Dutch, British and Nigerian corporations . . . 
aided and abetted the Nigerian government in committing violations 
of the law of nations.”264  The underlying problems that gave rise to 
the action in Kiobel are exactly those discussed in this Note; the plain-
tiffs further allege that Shell colluded with the Nigerian government 
and military, which killed, raped, and destroyed the property of Niger 
Delta residents at Shell’s behest.265 
  
 257 Saad Gul, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh 
Away: An Assessment of Corporate Liability Under § 1350, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 379, 
381 (2007) (“Today, the fifty or so corporations sued under the statute and the varied 
locale of the alleged torts read like a veritable Who’s Who of international business. 
They include: Abercrombie & Fitch, BHP, Chevron, Coca-Cola, Del Monte, Dole, 
Drummond Coal, Exxon-Mobil, The Gap, J.C. Penney Co., Levis Strauss, Nike, 
Pfizer, Rio Tinto, Shell, Siemens, Southern Peru Copper Corporation, Target, Texaco, 
Total, Union Carbide and Unocal.”). 
 258 Ingrid Wuerth, The Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common Law: A New 
Approach, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1931, 1960 (2010). 
 259 Id; see Koh, supra note 212, at 264–68; see also Steven R. Ratner, Corpo-
rations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 461 
(2001). 
 260 Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., 552 F. 3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(“The text of the [ATS] provides no express exception for corporations…and the law 
of this Circuit is that this statute grants jurisdiction from complaints…against corpo-
rate defendants.”). 
 261 Koh, supra note 212, at 265 (“If corporations have rights under interna-
tional law, by parity of reasoning, they must have duties as well.”). 
 262 SPIDERMAN (Columbia Pictures 2002). 
 263 621 F.3d 111, 149 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. 
Oct. 17, 2011)(No. 10-1491). 
 264 Id. at 117. 
 265 Id. at 123. 
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On September 17, 2010, the Second Circuit dismissed the cause 
of action with a blanket holding that the ATS does not provide for 
subject matter jurisdiction over corporations.
266
  Though concurring in 
the judgment, Judge Leval authored a separate opinion longer than the 
majority’s, criticizing its reasoning as dealing “a substantial blow to 
international law and its undertaking to protect fundamental human 
rights.”267  He has been joined by a chorus of legal commentators268—
and a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court was filed.
269
  The 
Supreme Court heard arguments on February 28, 2012, but issued an 
order the following week restoring the case to the calendar for rear-
gument during the next term—so as of the writing of this Note, no 
resolution on the merits has been reached.
270
 
 
C. U.S. Federal Tort Claims under U.S. Tort Law 
 
Nigerian nationals might have more success pursuing recourse in 
U.S. federal courts with common law tort claims against MNCs.  
Though the most active MNC in the Niger Delta is Shell, which is 
based in the Netherlands, two of the other major actors, ExxonMobil 
and Chevron, are U.S.-based.
271
  These MNCs are therefore already 
subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 
1332.
272
  Because ExxonMobil and Chevron are corporate citizens for 
the purposes of U.S. law, cases against them, even by foreign nation-
als, are properly in U.S. court even without the help of the ATS. 
  
 266 Id. at 148–49 (“No corporation has ever been subject to any form of liabil-
ity (whether civil, criminal, or otherwise) under the customary international law of 
human rights.  Rather, sources of customary international law have, on several occa-
sions, explicitly rejected the idea of corporate liability.  Thus, corporate liability has 
not attained a discernible, much less universal, acceptance among nations of the world 
in their relations inter se, and it cannot . . . as a result, form the basis of a suit under 
the ATS.”) (emphasis in original). 
 267 Id. at 149 (Leval, J., concurring in judgment). 
 268 Wuerth, supra note 258, at 1965; see also Tyler Giannini & Susan 
Farbstein, Corporate Accountability in Conflict Zones: How Kiobel Undermines the 
Nuremberg Legacy and Modern Human Rights, 52 HARV. INT. L. J. ONLINE 119, 121 
(2010); Odette Murray, David Kinley & Chip Pitts, Exaggerated Rumors of the Death 
of an Alien Tort? Corporations, Human Rights and the Remarkable Case of Kiobel, 
12 MELB. J. INT’L L. 57, 73–74 (2011). 
 269 Susan Farbstein, Kiobel Plaintiffs File Petition for Certiorari, INT’L 
HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM AT HARVARD LAW SCH. (Jun. 8, 
2011), http://harvardhumanrights.wordpress.com/2011/06/08/kiobel-plaintiffs-file-
petition-for-certiorari/. 
270
 Lyle Denniston, Kiobel to Be Expanded and Reargued, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 5, 2012, 2:01 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=140230. 
 271 See supra note 86, and accompanying text. 
 272 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2010). 
576 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 22: 535] 
Though the common law provides a road to recovery, this ap-
proach is not without its obstacles.  The most important procedural 
hurdle to common law tort claims against private, non-state actors
273
 
is the forum non conveniens (FNC) doctrine.  Foreign defendants who 
don’t want to litigate in American courts always invoke FNC, as the 
“first line of defense,”274 and argue that a foreign forum is more ap-
propriate for that particular legal action.
275
  Courts ruling on FNC 
motions are obligated to consider an array of public and private fac-
tors for and against dismissal.
276
  Public factors include docket con-
gestion, avoidance of conflict of laws, and “local interest in having 
localized controversies decided at home.”277  Private factors include 
accessibility of evidence and witnesses, costs, and the plaintiff’s rea-
son for choosing the original forum.
278
  The burden is on the defend-
ant (typically the moving party) to establish that an alternative forum 
is both available and adequate,
279
 and also “that the pertinent factors 
‘tilt strongly in favor of trial in the foreign forum.’”280  A foreign fo-
rum is “available” if the defendant “is subject to personal jurisdiction 
there and no other procedural bar . . . prevents resolution of the mer-
its.”281  It fulfills the adequacy requirement “when the parties will not 
be deprived of all remedies or treated unfairly, even though they may 
not enjoy the same benefits they might receive in an American 
court.”282 
Dismissal for FNC typically represents a serious setback for the 
plaintiff, as it necessitates beginning the lawsuit anew in another fo-
rum.
283
  For that reason, dismissal on FNC grounds was historically 
rare.
284
  Increasingly, however, defendants are actively litigating their 
  
 273 As non-state actors, the other obvious procedural hurdle, sovereign im-
munity, is not available to oil companies.  See supra note 214. 
 274 Rogge, supra note 88, at 299. 
 275 STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 205, at 391. 
 276 Id. at 392–93. 
 277 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947). 
 278 Id. at 508. 
 279 Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory Legislation: 
The Impact on the Available Alternative Forum Inquiry and on the Desirability of 
Forum Non Conveniens as a Defense Tactic, 56 KAN. L. REV. 609, 614 (2008). 
 280 STEPHENS, supra note 205, at 394 (citations omitted). 
 281 Heiser, supra note 279, at 614. 
 282 Id. at 615 (quoting Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 
221 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted)). 
 283 See Heiser, supra note 279, at 609 (“A forum non conveniens dismissal 
typically means that a foreign plaintiff must seek relief in the courts of his own coun-
try.  As a result, a foreign plaintiff will likely recover much less than a domestic 
plaintiff injured by a domestic company.”). 
 284 STEPHENS, supra note 205, at 392–93.  Invocation of FNC has greatly 
increased in the past few decades.  Only twenty-five cases were decided on FNC 
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motions for FNC, and “federal judges have been taking a lead in limit-
ing access to U.S. courts by aggressively enforcing and expanding the 
doctrine . . . .”285  One such case in which the defendant vigorously 
litigated and eventually won its motion for FNC was Aguinda v. Tex-
aco.
286
   
 
1. Success and Failure in Common Law         
Litigation Against an MNC: Texaco in      
Ecuador 
 
a. Round 1 – New York 
 
An attempt to bring common law tort claims against an American 
oil company began in 1994 in Aguinda v Texaco.
287
  The case origi-
nated as a class action by residents of the Ecuadorean Amazon against 
Texaco, which was then headquartered in New York.
288
  The plaintiffs 
alleged that Texaco’s operations had negligently discharged untreated 
waste, destroying a substantial portion of Ecuador’s tropical rain for-
est and endangering the lives of residents by exposing them to toxic 
  
grounds between 1965-1974; between 1975-1985, that number more than quadrupled 
to 111.  Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access 
Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 831 (1985).  Since that time, the invocation of FNC 
has increased even more dramatically—with a recent estimate of forty-three cases per 
year decided on those grounds.  Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation 
and Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1092 (2010) (citing Christopher A. 
Whytock, Politics and the Rule of Law in Transnational Judicial Governance: The 
Case of Forum Non Conveniens 15–16 (Feb. 28, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=969033). 
 285 Robertson, supra note 284, at 1084. 
 286 Aguinda v. Texaco, (Aguinda I), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4718 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994). 
 287 Id.  The historical, political, geographical and socioeconomic similarities 
between the extractive industries in Ecuador and Nigeria are striking.  The region in 
Ecuador where oil is extracted is remote but populated, and was once a diverse tropi-
cal ecosystem.  Oil extraction began in the 1960s, and has since generated billions of 
dollars for the federal government—making Ecuador’s leaders loathe to take action 
that would diminish national revenues.  Those victimized by the pollution in the re-
gion are poor ethnic minorities who have not enjoyed any of the benefits that Ecua-
dor’s relationship with Texaco has generated.  Malcolm Rogge, Ecuador’s Oil Re-
gion: Developing Community Legal Resources in a National Security Zone, 1996 
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 233, 234–36 (1997). 
 288 The complaint named 74 plaintiffs, and the class those plaintiffs represent-
ed was estimated at 30,000 residents of the region.  Judith Kimerling, Transnational 
Operations, Bi-National Justice: ChevronTexaco and Indigenous Huaorani and 
Kichwa in the Amazon Rainforest in Ecuador, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 445, 464 
(2007). 
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chemicals.
289
  Almost eighteen years later, the litigation is still ongo-
ing, and while description of the entire litigation process would be 
overly cumbersome, a number of the decisions and procedural com-
plications are especially significant for future plaintiffs. 
The case was initially filed in the Southern District of New York, 
and defendant Texaco filed a motion for dismissal for FNC.
290
  The 
district judge noted that this argument for dismissal was particularly 
strong, because even though the events may have been initiated at 
Texaco headquarters in the United States, “[d]isputes over class mem-
bership, determination of . . . damages, and the need for large amounts 
of testimony with interpreters, perhaps often in local dialects, would 
make effective adjudication in New York problematic at best.”291   
The plaintiffs and amici argued that given the state of the Ecuad-
orean judiciary, a fair trial in Ecuador was unlikely.
292
  The district 
court judge was not persuaded.
293
  Demonstrating the legal-political 
tightrope that federal judges walk when ruling on matters of interna-
tional consequence, he opined that “impartiality in adjudication is a 
potential problem in all jurisdictions including those in the United 
States.”294  Realistically, some judicial systems are more advanced 
than others: they are better resourced and more independent from oth-
er branches of government and therefore better able to freely interpret 
the law.  But, as the United States becomes increasingly vilified for its 
economic and military involvement in other countries,
295
 projecting 
the U.S. legal system abroad by taking cases away from foreign courts 
could have negative diplomatic ramifications.
296
   
  
 289 Aguinda I, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4718, at *1.  Texaco’s oil fields pro-
duced more than 3.2 million gallons of toxic waste water daily—”virtually all of 
which was dumped into the environment via unlined, open-air…waste pits, without 
treatment or monitoring – a practice that has been generally banned in the United 
States…since 1979.”  Kimerling, supra note 288, at 457.  Though little research exists 
regarding the long terms effects of exposure to the toxic substances contained in 
crude oil (see supra Part I.A), a number of studies have been conducted in Ecuador as 
a result of the Aguinda litigation.  These studies have noted increased incidence of 
several types of cancers in populations affected by the spillage of oil/untreated waste.  
See Hurtig & San Sebastian, supra note 35, at 1025; Anna-Karin Hurtig & Miguel 
San Sebastian, Incidence of Childhood Leukemia and Oil Exploitation in the Amazon 
Basin of Ecuador, 10 INT. J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 245, 247, 249 (2005). 
 290 Aguinda I, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4718, at *4. 
 291 Id. at *5. 
 292 Id. at *7. 
 293 Id. 
 294 Id. 
 295 See, e.g. Joseph S. Nye Jr. Soft Power and American Foreign Policy, 119 
POL. SCI. Q. 255, 255–56 (2004) (discussing the increase in anti-Americanism abroad 
as a result of changes in U.S. foreign policy). 
 296 See supra notes 235–38 and accompanying text. 
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The decision in the initial Aguinda action reflects an attempt by 
the district judge to balance the many conflicting political, legal, dip-
lomatic, and practical issues at stake.  Though both parties submitted 
“a massive amount of material,” the judge was loath to dismiss the 
action.
297
  He ordered further discovery, asked Texaco to convert its 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, 
and strongly encouraged settlement.
298
  The district judge’s suggestion 
of settlement went unheeded, and, in a subsequent proceeding in front 
of a different district judge, Texaco won its motion to dismiss for 
FNC.
299
  
 
b. Round 2 – Ecuador 
 
Had this been a typical case, the Ecuadorean plaintiffs would not 
have attempted to re-file the case in their home jurisdiction, having 
already expended considerable resources and nine years attempting to 
get the case into U.S. federal court.
300
  Unfortunately for Texaco,
301
 
the lawsuit didn’t just go away.  The gravity of harm was so severe, 
and the plaintiffs’ lawyers were so motivated, that in May 2003, many 
of the Aguinda plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Chevron and Texaco 
in a superior court in Lago Agrio, Ecuador.
302
   
  
 297 Aguinda I, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4718, at *2. 
 298 Id. at *3.  The decision heavily encouraged settlement, concluding that 
“[t]his dispute is not necessarily best resolved by further litigation” and suggesting 
that resolution would be simpler for all parties if the monetary damage claims were 
dropped, voluntary corrective measures were taken, and “an impartial person select-
ed” to further assist in mediation.  Id. at *31–32. 
 299 Aguinda v. Texaco, (Aguinda II), 945 F. Supp. 625, 628 (S.D.N.Y 1996), 
aff’d, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).  Demonstrative of flaws in the Ecuadorian gov-
ernment at the time, and the uncertainty the plaintiffs faced in being forced to litigate 
at home, the Republic of Ecuador supported dismissal in 1994, and 1996.  Brief for 
The Republic of Ecuador as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendants at 1, Aguinda v. 
Texaco, 945 F. Supp. 625 (1996) (No. 93-7527), 1994 WL 16188165, at *1.  By 
2002, however, when the case reached the Second Circuit on appeal, the Republic had 
completely changed its position.  The Attorney General, Dr. Ramon Jimenez-Carbo 
filed an amicus brief on behalf the state for the Aguinda plaintiffs—opposing dismis-
sal to Ecuador for FNC.  Brief for The Republic of Ecuador as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Appellants at 1-2, Aguinda v. Texaco, (Aguinda III), 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 
2002) (Nos. 01-7756-L, 01-7758-Con), 2001 WL 3436915.  
 300 Kimerling, supra note 288, at 466. 
 301 Texaco merged with Chevron in 2001, so later references will be to Chev-
ron.  Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Consent Agreement Allows the Merger 
of Chevron Corp. and Texaco Inc., Preserves Market Competition (Sep. 7, 2001), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/09/chevtex.shtm. 
 302 Kimerling, supra note 288, at 475.  The FNC dismissal was very unpopu-
lar with Ecuadorian citizens, and led to mass demonstrations at the Attorney Gen-
eral’s office in the capital, Quito.  Rogge, supra note 88, at 310.  The Ecuadorian 
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The trial in Ecuador was rife with difficulties and irregularities.
303
  
Despite agreeing to, indeed, fighting for, the jurisdiction of the Ec-
uadorean courts,
304
 Chevron continued to voice its displeasure with 
the legal action in the American media.
305
  The ultimate outcome, 
however, was a recommendation by the court-appointed Special Mas-
ter for $27.3 billion in damages for the plaintiffs—a figure that sent 
shockwaves through the legal community.
306
  The damage award was 
ultimately reduced to $8.6 billion by the Ecuadorean court.
307
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
iteration of the lawsuit sought “judicial determination of the costs of a comprehensive 
environmental remediation – including removal of all pollution that threatens human 
health and the environment, restoration of natural resources, and medical monitoring . 
. . .”  Kimerling, supra note 288, at 476.  Because the group of plaintiffs was different 
than in the original Aguinda action, they have since been referred to, in both commen-
tary and in further litigation, as the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs (“LAPs”), Chevron Corp. v. 
Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 581, 600 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 303 Initially, the lower court dismissed the action against Chevron, following a 
number of ex parte meetings between Chevron’s legal representatives and court offi-
cials.  Appellate review at the Ecuadorian Supreme Court was delayed while the 
country experienced a political and constitutional crisis that closed down the judiciary 
for almost a year.  Kimerling, supra note 288, at 481. 
 304 Aguinda III, 303 F.3d 470 at 475. (“Texaco consented to personal jurisdic-
tion in Ecuador as to the Aguinda plaintiffs…[and]…stipulated it would waive its 
statute of limitations defenses . . . .”).  
 305 In 2008, two of the Ecuadorian attorneys leading the lawsuit were awarded 
the Goldman Prize, which commends individuals for environmental achievements, 
and includes a $150,000 prize for each winner.  Chevron publicly criticized the 
Goldman Foundation for being “misled,” and called the attorneys “con men.”  Tyche 
Hendricks, Controversy Mires Choice for Goldman Prize, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., 
Apr. 15, 2008, at B1; Oil Giant Calls Eco-Award Winners ‘Con Men,’ MSNBC.COM 
(Apr. 15, 2008, 10:37 AM), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24126664/ns/world_news-world_environment/.  The 
Goldman Foundation, which has been awarding the prize for 19 years, reiterated its 
respect for the selectees, replying that its selection process includes five months of 
fact checking, and input from environmental experts at 50 organizations.  Hendricks, 
supra. 
 306 Robertson, supra note 284, at 1083.  If upheld, the award would have been 
“the largest award for environmental damage ever awarded against an oil company.”  
Id. 
 307 Simon Romero & Clifford Krauss, Chevron Is Ordered to Pay $9 Billion 
by Ecuador Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2011, at A4.  This reduced award is still the 
largest in an environmental damage action.  Chad Bray, Judge Puts off Chevron Deci-
sion, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704900004576152421154113438.ht
ml. 
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c. Round 3 – The Return to New York 
 
Clearly unhappy with this outcome, Chevron has returned to the 
United States to challenge the judgment’s validity in New York,308 
though its position is undercut by its previous argument that Ecuador 
was the proper forum for litigation.
309
  After arguing so strenuously 
that Ecuador was the proper forum and that trying the case there was 
in the interest of justice, challenging the subsequent outcome consti-
tutes a clear case of “forum shopper’s remorse.”310  Were the facts this 
simple, this case would demonstrate a prime example of what Casey 
and Ristroph termed “boomerang litigation,” wherein the case returns 
to the forum from which it was previously dismissed.
311
  The result of 
boomerang litigation is often dismissal on procedural grounds, rather 
than on the merits—leaving the original plaintiffs without opportunity 
to recover.
312
 
Non-recognition of foreign judgments is within the discretionary 
authority of the U.S. federal courts
313—so, unfortunately, it is still 
  
 308 Ben Casselman, Chevron Expects to Fight Ecuador Lawsuit in U.S., WALL 
ST. J., July 20, 2009, at B3, (“‘We’re not paying and we’re going to fight this for 
years if not decades into the future,’ Chevron spokesman Don Campbell said in an 
interview.”). 
 309 Ben Casselman & Chad Bray, Ecuador Seeks to Block Chevron, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 5, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704342404574575931947490074.ht
ml.  While the case was being litigated in U.S. courts, “Chevron submitted fourteen 
sworn affidavits attesting to the fairness and adequacy of Ecuador’s courts.”  Steven 
Donziger, Laura Garr & Aaron Marr Page, Rainforest Chernobyl Revisited: The 
Clash of Human Rights and BIT Investor Claims: Chevron’s Abusive Litigation in 
Ecuador’s Amazon, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF, 8, 8 (2004). 
   310  Christopher Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conven-
iens and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1447 
(2011) (quoting Michael D. Goldhaber, Forum Shopper’s Remorse, CORP. COUNS., 
Apr. 2010, at 63). 
 311 M. Ryan Casey & Barrett Ristroph, Boomerang Litigation: How Conven-
ient is Forum Non Conveniens in Transnational Litigation?, 4 B.Y.U. INT’L L. & 
MGMT. REV. 21, 22 (2007). 
 312 Id.  See also Whytock & Robertson, supra note 310, at 1451.  The authors 
have elaborated on the concept of the boomerang suit, and created the term “transna-
tional access to justice gap,” for the situation where a case is dismissed for FNC, is 
decided abroad on the merits, and then boomerangs back to the original forum to 
challenge the validity of the foreign judgment.  Id. at 1450. 
 313 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 482 (1987); Unif. 
Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act § 4, 13 (U.L.A) (Supp. 2008), 
available at 
http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/brand/2005%20NCCUSL%20UFCJRA%20text.pdf [here-
inafter UFCMJRA]. 
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possible for Chevron to avoid liability.
314
  Under the Uniform For-
eign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act (UFCMJRA), which 
has been adopted by a majority of states,
315
 U.S. courts may not rec-
ognize judgments “rendered under a judicial system that does not pro-
vide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the require-
ments of due process of law.”316  Paradoxically, the UFCMJRA re-
quires that judges perform precisely the type of analysis they are in-
structed to avoid when considering FNC motions.  In most cases, 
however, it would likely be difficult for the moving party to defini-
tively demonstrate that a foreign judicial system failed to provide im-
partial tribunals. 
Such was not the case for Chevron.  As the litigation progressed 
in Ecuador, the lead attorney for the plaintiffs, Steven Donziger, con-
tacted documentary filmmaker Joseph Berlinger about the case.  The 
result was a powerful, well-received documentary called Crude.
317
  
The film significantly raised awareness about a lawsuit that was, at the 
time, essentially unknown to American audiences.  However, that 
negative publicity has cut both ways, and Berlinger himself became 
embroiled in satellite litigation when Chevron demanded he turn over 
more than 500 hours of his unseen footage.
318
  Berlinger was subse-
quently ordered to produce the outtakes.
319
  In these outtakes, Steven 
Donziger is filmed saying things such as “‘[t]hey’re all [i.e., the Ecua-
dorian judges] corrupt!  It’s – it’s their birthright to be corrupt.”320  
Donziger is also on film discussing plans to humiliate and intimidate 
Ecuadorean judges in order to get favorable rulings.
321
   
  
 314 Lucien J. Dhooge, Aguinda v. Chevron-Texaco: Discretionary Grounds 
for the Non-Recognition of Foreign Judgments for Environmental Injury in the United 
States, 28 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 241, 244 (2010). 
 315 The majority of states have adopted the UFCMJRA, and many of the 
remaining states have adopted laws that comport with its standards, or the similar 
Restatement position.  Heiser, supra note 279, at 634–35.   
 316 UFCMJRA § 4(b). 
 317 CRUDE (First Run Features 2009).  Critics called Crude a “forceful, often 
infuriating story,” and the type of movie Michael Moore would have made if he 
“wanted to make a serious movie about capitalism.  Manohla Dargis, In the Snows of 
Sundance, a Marked Chill in the Air, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/23/movies/23sund.html?_r=1; John Anderson, Not 
Simply an Underdog’s Tale, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2009, at 26.  In January 2011, 
Berlinger was ordered to turn over the footage.  Dave Itzkoff, Documentary Filmmak-
er Doesn’t Qualify for a Journalist’s Privilege, a Court Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 
2011, at A15. 
 318 John Schwartz & Dave Itzkoff, Scenes Cut from Film Find New Role in 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2011, at A13. 
 319 Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 320 Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp.2d 581, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 321 Id. at 611. 
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The footage was subsequently used by Chevron to support its mo-
tion against enforcement of the Ecuadorean judgment.  Unsurprising-
ly, admissions of misconduct, and extemporaneous description of the 
judicial system as corrupt and partial by the lead plaintiffs’ counsel 
bolstered Chevron’s argument for injunction.  On March 8, 2011, 
Judge Kaplan granted Chevron a preliminary injunction prohibiting 
the judgment’s enforcement anywhere except Ecuador.322  Chevron 
has no assets in Ecuador.
323
  The effect of the judgment is to undo 
eighteen years of litigation.  Citing heavily to the outtakes, Judge 
Kaplan found “abundant evidence . . . that Ecuador [had] not provided 
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with due process of 
law.”324  Ecuador’s Ambassador to the United States was quick to 
respond, expressing “consternation that a U.S. court has elected to 
pass judgment on Ecuador’s courts.”325  A bizarre legal pretzel thus 
emerged, such that eighteen years after the litigation began, the parties 
are essentially back at square one—albeit attempting to argue posi-
tions opposite to those they took in the original litigation.
326
  In yet 
another twist to the legal pretzel, on September 19, 2011, the Second 
Circuit vacated Judge Kaplan’s preliminary injunction in its entire-
ty.
327
 
The Ecuadorean action is a single case with an as-yet uncertain 
outcome, and it is therefore of indeterminate precedential value.  
However, the events in Ecuador that gave rise to the litigation are 
remarkably similar to those that have occurred more than 5,000 miles 
away in the Niger Delta.  The complicated course the Aguinda action 
has charted would likely influence the behavior of defendant oil com-
  
 322 Id. at 660.  Interestingly, Judge Kaplan also ordered the production of the 
outtakes in Berlinger.  Ben Casselman & Chad Bray, Chevron is Granted Ecuador 
Injunction, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2011, at B1. 
 323 Donziger, 768 F. Supp.2d at 660. 
 324 Casselman & Bray, supra note 322. 
 325 Lawrence Hurley, Ecuador’s U.S. Ambassador Speaks Out on Chevron 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/03/10/10greenwire-ecuadors-us-ambassador-
speaks-out-on-chevron-c-86771.html. 
 326 Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 596 (“[I]t is well to bear in mind that the 
positions of both sides have changed 180 degrees since the predecessor litigation in 
New York.  Chevron then touted the adequacy of the Ecuadorian judiciary, while the 
plaintiffs—briefs bearing Donziger’s name as counsel—argued that Ecuador could 
not provide an adequate forum and that its judiciary was corrupt.”) 
 327 Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 2011 WL 4375022 at *1 (2d. Cir. 2011).  In the 
opinion following its September 19 order, the Second Circuit noted that “[t]he story 
of the conflict between Chevron and the residents of the Lago Agrio region of the 
Ecuadorian Amazon must be among the most extensively told in the history of the 
American federal judiciary.”  Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 235 (2d Cir. 
2012). 
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panies if sued by Nigerian plaintiffs.  Chevron has been embroiled in 
this single action for more than a decade and a half.  A decade and a 
half’s worth of litigation costs have been expended, and the corpora-
tion may yet be liable for billions of dollars in environmental remedia-
tion damages.  A decade and a half of bad publicity has harmed Chev-
ron’s public image in an era of increasingly socially-conscious inves-
tors.
328
  While it is hard to predict the impact on future conduct, the 
totality of these circumstances might influence Chevron or Exxon to 
defend differently against a potential lawsuit by Nigerian plaintiffs.
329
  
Thus, a common law tort lawsuit by Nigerian plaintiffs may very well 
be worthwhile. 
 
 
2. Common Law Tort Claims Available to Nige-
rian Plaintiffs 
 
a. Making the Prima Facie Case 
 
Oil spills in the Niger Delta trigger MNC liability for tortious in-
fliction of personal injury.  Though proving intentional infliction of 
harm is essentially impossible, poor maintenance of pipelines and 
sluggish responses to leaks or blowouts could support a finding of 
negligence.  A common law claim for events arising in a foreign fo-
rum requires application of the law of that forum by the U.S. court.
330
  
Though this can be difficult in certain contexts, both the Nigerian and 
American legal systems have the same roots: English Common 
  
 328 Socially responsible investing (SRI), generally refers to investment seek-
ing both financial and sustainable development returns.  In the past 15 years, invest-
ment trends show a 380% increase in investment in socially responsible organiza-
tions.  SOC. INV. FORUM FOUND., 2010 REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING 
TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2010), available at 
http://ussif.org/resources/research/documents/2010TrendsES.pdf.  See also 60 
Minutes: Amazon Crude (CBS News television broadcast May 3, 2009).  
 329 Chevron has recently launched the Niger Delta Partnership Initiative to 
establish “innovative multi-stakeholder partnerships that support programs and activi-
ties, which empower communities to achieve a peaceful and enabling environment for 
equitable economic growth” in the region.  About the Foundation, NIGER DELTA 
PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE, http://ndpifoundation.org/about-the-foundation/ (last visited 
Aug. 20, 2012).  In February 2011, the foundation announced a joint partnership with 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), pledging to invest 
$25 million for development in the region in four years.  Chevron Foundation, 
USAID Give Nigeria $50M, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 17, 2011, 11:24 AM), 
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9LEKNG80.htm.  While this pro-
active gesture is commendable, and may yield significant development dividends, it 
does not necessarily absolve the corporation of liability for negligent oil spills. 
 330 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 8, 136 (1965). 
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Law.
331
  Therefore the elements of a tort claim in Nigeria are virtually 
identical to those in the United States.
332
  To prove negligence, the 
plaintiff must show that “the defendant owes him a duty of care, that 
the duty was breached and that damage resulted from the breach . . . 
.”333   
Presently, Nigerian plaintiffs are much more likely to recover 
from U.S.-based companies in a U.S. federal courtroom than any-
where else.  Establishing the first two elements of a prima facie show-
ing of MNC negligence would not be difficult.  The Petroleum Act
334
  
imposes an affirmative duty on foreign oil companies operating in 
Nigeria to take precautions against pollution, and to maintain up-to-
date equipment.
335
  Negligent maintenance fulfills the second element.  
By even a lenient standard, pipelines that have not been replaced or 
updated despite continuous use for almost half a century have been 
negligently maintained.
336
 
The causation element of a tort case is always the most difficult to 
establish.
337
  Nigerian law requires actual causation,
338
 and allows for 
limitation or elimination of liability when the harm suffered is “too 
remote” in relation to the breach.339  This is analogous to the distinc-
tion between but-for and proximate causation in American jurispru-
dence.
340
  The farther away in time and space the victim is from the 
would-be tortfeasor, the less willing the law is to hold the tortfeasor 
  
 331 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW at xii (3rd ed. 
2005); Jill Cottrell, The Tort of Negligence in Nigeria, 17 J. AFR. L. 30, 30 (1973). 
 332 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281. 
 333 FRYNAS, supra note 138, at 190. 
 334 See supra notes 173–74. 
 335 See supra text accompanying note 173. 
 336 See supra text accompanying note 173.  In Nigerian courts, oil companies 
have typically had the upper hand with respect to the negligence element.  The MNCs 
have the advantage of technical expertise regarding their own operations because it is 
difficult for plaintiffs to provide sufficient scientific expert testimony to counter the 
perpetual position of MNCs that they were exercising due care.  See FRYNAS, supra 
note 138, at 191.  This particular advantage would not follow the MNCs home into 
the federal court system, however.  Experts, while not inexpensive, are not nearly as 
difficult to come by in the U.S.  See generally MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON ET AL., 
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EXPERT TESTIMONY IN FEDERAL CIVIL TRIALS: A PRELIMINARY 
ANALYSIS (2000), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ExpTesti.pdf/$file/ExpTesti.pdf. 
 337 Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1737 
(1985) (“In all of tort law, there is no concept which has been as pervasive and yet 
elusive as the causation requirement…”). 
 338 See FRYNAS, supra note 138, at 190. 
 339 Cottrell, supra note 331, at 34–35. 
 340 Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the 
Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 467–70 (1980). 
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liable.
341
  For Nigerian plaintiffs in oil spill litigation, actual causation 
is fairly clear.  But-for the extractive operations of the oil companies, 
particularly the snaking of miles of pipeline across the Delta wetlands, 
oil spills would not plague the region to the extent that they do.   
Establishing proximate causation, in other words, demonstrating 
that the harm is not too remote, could be difficult for Nigerian plain-
tiffs.  For the reasons detailed in Part IV.A, particularly pipeline van-
dalism, MNCs have traditionally enjoyed nearly-automatic exemption 
from liability in the small number of actions attempted in Nigerian 
courts.
342
  Sabotage by local militants, the vast majority of whom are 
members of disorganized, poorly identified groups, has been perva-
sive enough that MNCs have always had viable third-party wrongdo-
ers to blame.
343
  In order to eliminate this liability loophole, a spill 
would need to be documented by a legitimate, unbiased source in a 
time of relative peace. 
 
b. Who Makes the Prima Facie Case? 
 
Timing is critical in conflict resolution.  The violence in the Niger 
Delta has occurred in waves, with a number of pronounced lulls in 
recent years.
344
  Documenting damages during a lull could provide a 
viable starting point for a legal action.  This would require the in-
volvement of grassroots activists to impart the viability of a potential 
lawsuit to Delta residents who are understandably unfamiliar with the 
U.S. federal legal system—and the necessity of continued peace for 
that lawsuit’s success.  A wide variety of international environmental 
and human rights organizations are active in the Niger Delta, includ-
ing Amnesty International,
345
 Human Rights Watch,
346
 and Friends of 
the Earth International.
347
  These groups, and others, have already 
  
 341 Wright, supra note 337, at 1737. With that time and space, the likelihood 
that either the victim or a third party contributed to the loss increases.  See id. at 
1817–18. 
 342 See supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text. 
 343 See supra notes 115–20 and accompanying text. 
 344 See supra Part III.B.4. 
 345 See PETROLEUM, POLLUTION & POVERTY, supra note 78. 
 346 See generally Nigeria, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 2010), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/nigeria_0.pdf. 
 347 Friends of the Earth International is an umbrella environmental network 
made up of 5,000 activist groups in seventy-six countries.  About Friends of the Earth 
International, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH INT’L, http://www.foei.org/en/who-we-are/about 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2011).  The twofold purposes of Nigeria’s Friends of the Earth 
International chapter are: “to act as a peaceful pressure group, campaigning for 
change in the policies of governmental, non-governmental and commercial organisa-
tions where those policies are likely to act against environmental human rights” and 
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documented damage done by oil spills
348—and could likely perform 
similar roles in the future. 
 
c. Avoiding the Aguinda Quagmire 
 
Even if Nigerian plaintiffs could establish prima facie negligence 
cases, procedural obstacles might still keep their suits out of federal 
courts. Aguinda demonstrates how unpredictable an international tort 
case of significant magnitude can be—and the multitude of substan-
tive, procedural and financial obstacles plaintiffs must successfully 
negotiate in order to have their day in court.  But as arduous a road as 
it has been, recovery for the plaintiffs is not off the table.  And argua-
bly, but-for the video evidence of misconduct by counsel, the judg-
ment enforcement challenge by Chevron would not have gained much 
traction.  Aguinda will be doubly useful for Nigerian plaintiffs (and 
their attorneys), as it demonstrates what to do, and what not to do. 
For a region like the Niger Delta that has been trapped in a cycli-
cal crisis for decades, however, a change in tactics would be benefi-
cial.  The region’s stakeholders have become entrenched in their tradi-
tional positions, apparently preferring to do as they have always done, 
even if it means that they get what they’ve always gotten.  Pursuing 
legal remedies has never been a viable option for Niger Delta resi-
dents, for procedural, political, economic, and cultural reasons.  But 
legal action in the United States is a viable option—a new solution to 
an old problem.  A successful common law tort claim by a Nigerian 
plaintiff would not be a miracle solution to the region’s or country’s 
problems; solving those problems demands more than a lawsuit could 
ever provide.  The law isn’t a business of miracles, it’s a business of 
chances.  And while the chance to provide “partial relief to some vic-
tims is not ideal . . . it is better than providing zero relief to any vic-
tims.”349   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Residents of the Niger Delta have been forced to tolerate toxic 
levels of spilled crude oil for decades.  Properly extracted by a re-
sponsible industry, oil of the quality and quantity available in the Ni-
ger Delta could be a blessing.  But to the vast majority, it has been 
  
“to enable local people to defend their environmental human rights law.”  About ERA, 
ENVTL. RIGHTS ACTION/FRIENDS OF THE EARTH: NIGERIA, http://www.eraction.org/ 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2011). 
 348 See PETROLEUM, POLLUTION & POVERTY, supra note 78. 
 349 Farber, supra note 52, at 1128. 
588 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 22: 535] 
nothing but a curse.  Poor governmental control of the oil industry by 
faraway bureaucrats has allowed for a staggering level of pollution.  
The end—massive wealth for those faraway bureaucrats—has justi-
fied the means—negligently irresponsible, if cost-effective, pipeline 
maintenance.  The result is a region more “battered by oil” than any-
where else on earth.
350
 
Faced with a nearly inconceivable problem, Niger Delta residents 
have watched virtually every potential solution go up in smoke.  
Though statutes regulating foreign oil companies are in place, they are 
only intermittently enforced.  The few individuals with the patience, 
the funds, and the luck to reach a verdict on the merits in a Nigerian 
court have recovered damage awards that are marginal at best.  It is 
entirely possible that a case against an oil company tried in a court-
room devoid of the myriad difficulties present in a Nigerian court-
room would have a very different outcome from what the typical Ni-
gerian plaintiff has become accustomed to.  If the corruption, the pro-
cedural delays, the technological inadequacies, and the inconsistencies 
regarding standing and joinder are eliminated, the law itself can take 
center stage.  And the law is biased toward neither the plaintiff nor the 
defendant.   
A different set of difficulties will present itself to Nigerian plain-
tiffs—but these difficulties are not insurmountable obstacles.  Human 
rights groups have attempted to attract attention to the plight of Niger 
Delta residents for years, and channeling that attention into concerted 
legal action would represent an intelligent adaptation to an ever-
changing legal environment.  The Deepwater Horizon disaster provid-
ed American observers with an alarming point of reference: the deluge 
of oil unleashed in the Gulf of Mexico is less than half of what Niger 
Delta residents have been subjected to.  Before the Deepwater Hori-
zon leak had even been capped, BP set aside a claims fund of $20 
billion,
351
 but across the Atlantic, MNCs have fought and evaded lia-
bility at every opportunity.  This stark double-standard is unaccepta-
ble.  Regardless of standard operating procedures, “ethical responsi-
bilities of transnational businesses do not end at national borders.”352  
Reconciling this double-standard and the decades-old cycle of pov-
erty, pollution, and violence can, and should, occur in the same place: 
a United States courtroom. 
  
 350 Nossiter, supra note 99. 
 351 Press Release, British Petroleum, BP Establishes $20 Billion Claims Fund 
for Deepwater Horizon Spill and Outlines Dividend Decisions (June 16, 2010), avail-
able at 
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7062966. 
 352 Rogge, supra note 88, at 316. 
